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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation:  The Logistics Potentials of the Aqaba Special 
Economic Zone (ASEZ) as a Regional Gateway 
 
Degree:      MSc
 
The dissertation is a study of the potential hinterland markets of the Aqaba Port and 
ultimately the logistics potential of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in 
view of the ongoing trade liberalisation and the expected economic cooperation in 
the Mashrek region. 
 
A look is taken at the logistics tendencies in the Mashrek region and the currently 
available levels of major logistics and transport physical infrastructure. Similarly, the 
efficiency of the transport logistics system in the region is examined.  
 
The present logistics environment in the ASEZ is described and the major logistics 
shortages and deficiencies in the ASEZ’s contribution to the national and regional 
multimodal transport network are identified.  
 
The total transport logistics cost concept is employed as a formal method, for the first 
time, to identify the true potential hinterland markets of Aqaba Port. Accordingly, an 
econometric model and cost analysis approaches are developed to investigate which 
maritime trade route could use Aqaba Port as the least cost route for shipments to the 
main economic centers in Mashrek countries.  
 
The concluding chapters analyse the location advantage of the ASEZ and examines 
several national and regional multimodal transport solutions such as a land bridge 
between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean based on the total cost concept.  
 
KEYWORDS: ASEZ, Total Cost, Logistics, Multimodal, Transport, Efficiency, 
Location, Aqaba Port.  
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“In the past few years, Jordan has made great strides 
toward becoming a full player in all that the global 
economy has to offer.”( Amman, 11-Dec-2002) 
 
 
“ Thus, we have to keep the pace of opening up on the 
world around us, reutilise the experiences of others, and 
the scientific, technological and cultural inputs of this 
age.” (Amman, 25-May-2003) 
 
 
“ Great opportunities lie ahead. A world where all people 
share in the promise of human knowledge; participate in 
global prosperity and growth; and fulfill their human 
potential. This is our goal in Jordan, and this is Jordan's 
goal for the Middle East.” (Chicago, 11-Jun-2004) 
 
 
“ In Jordan, an extensive reform program is well 
underway. We are determined to help our people achieve 
their potential, in every sphere. In the economy, we have 
encouraged innovation, enterprise, and partnership with 
the private sector.” (London, 02-Jul-2004) 
 
His Majesty King Abdullah II 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Increasingly, it is becoming evident that international economic and political 
pressure is building up to bring stability to the Middle East and to modernise the 
economic and social structures of this region’s economies. Unless these efforts 
succeed, the region risks becoming marginalised from the global economic system. 
In fact countries of the region are gradually accepting to shift responsibility to 
markets and to encourage greater integration with the world economy. Several 
countries are negotiating or have signed major market opening agreements with 
foreign partners.  Furthermore, globalisation and regionalism will soon lead to the 
opening of the transport market in this region, particularly the Mashrek region. 
Subsequently trade barriers giving preferences to national ports will be removed and 
shippers and carriers will have several chances to select the best route for shipments, 
which will increase competition between intermodal nodes in the region. 
 
Accordingly, in its efforts to integrate the country into the global trading system and 
enhance its competitiveness, in mid February 2001, the Government of Jordan 
decided to declare the whole city of Aqaba, where country’s only port (Aqaba Port), 
as a duty free Special Economic Zone. Many writers and experts suggest that Aqaba 
Port chances in the upcoming competition are low for many reasons; specifically for 
being situated away from international maritime trade routes and because other ports 
in the region are closer to hinterland markets than Aqaba Port (Wilbur, 2001; Muller, 
2002; Bar-El, 2003). On the other hand, a few other studies suggested that the 
progress in the peace process might generate additional freight flows via Aqaba Port 
(GOPA, 1996; JICA, 1996). However, all the work that has been done so far used 
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informal methods, which do not allow for tests of hypotheses. Evidently, there is a 
need for more studies to be conducted to formally identify the true potential markets 
of Aqaba Port. Therefore, this research aims at identifying the competitive maritime 
trade routes and the potential hinterlands markets of Aqaba Port and ultimately 
highlighting the logistics importance of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ). 
A second goal is to examine the logistics viability of a land bridge between Aqaba 
Port on the Red Sea and ports of the region on the Mediterranean.  
 
In order to achieve the research objectives it was necessary to define the potential 
region from political, social and economic perspectives before narrowing the scope 
of the research to the ASEZ logistics infrastructure, particularly Aqaba Port. 
Accordingly, chapter two defines the Mashrek region and explains the trade 
liberalisation trends in this region. It also describes the present logistics environment 
in each country of the region. 
 
Chapter three highlights Jordan’s economic policy and its effect on transport and 
logistics industries locally and regionally. Furthermore, it describes the available 
logistics infrastructure in the ASEZ, Jordan’s main logistics center, and the demand 
on its logistics platforms and facilities. 
 
Chapter four uses the total transport logistics cost concept to develop an econometric 
and cost analysis for shipping to the Mashrek region via Aqaba Port. It identifies the 
different routes available between main economic centers in the region and Asian 
markets and examines whether transporting via ASEZ could be the least cost route. 
 
Chapter five provides an analytical assessment of the results in previous chapters. 
Further, it pinpoints the major shortages in ASEZ’s logistics chain and examines 
several intermodal solutions for Jordan and the region.  
 
Finally, the conclusion in the last chapter summarizes the findings of this research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.  LOGISTICS TENDICIES IN THE “MASHREK” SUB-REGION 
 
 
2.1 Background 
 
The movement toward globalization and trade liberalization paralleled by the 
revolution in information and communications technologies is continually advancing 
and significantly altering existing markets and triggering a race for the future. 
Apparently a new economic era is materializing and driving more countries toward 
global economic integration. While partnering and forming alliances are companies’ 
best response (Doz, 1998), regionalism is emerging as countries’ powerful option in 
face of these ongoing global trends (Ezrahi, 2003). National borders are increasingly 
disappearing and trade barriers are dismantled. The last decade witnessed the 
creation of various regional trade blocks as well as the expansion of existing blocks 
to encourage regional trade and economic integration and prosperity.   
 
Europe - Mediterranean Partnership initiative between member states of the 
European Union (EU) and their twelve Mediterranean partners was launched at the 
1995 Barcelona Euro - Mediterranean Conference and referred to as the “Barcelona 
Declaration”. The main objective of this partnership is the creation of a multilateral 
Free-Trade-Area (FTA) around year 2010 (Muller-Jentsch, 2002). Similarly, 
following the Oslo peace accord many economic initiatives were proposed, including 
a “Free Trade Area” to connect the economies of Jordan, Palestine and Israel 
(Lawrence, 1995). A study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development-OECD (1997) concludes that most of the Middle East economies have 
similar comparative advantage with limited scale. Further, it calls for implementing 
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the international concept “growth triangles”, which facilitates sub-regional economic 
co-operation, in the Middle East between Arab countries and Israel. Evidently, the 
base for regional integration exists but lacks the momentum and the political will. 
Although slow, the underway national, regional and international political and 
economic efforts seem to be leading to successful growth triangles in the region. 
 
2.2 Mashrek Sub-Region 
 
The Europe - Mediterranean Partnership initiative has been internationally accepted 
as a mechanism for speeding the economic and trade reforms in the region.   
 
The Mediterranean partners include Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia), Mashrek countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Israel and the West 
Bank and Gaza), Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. Both Maghreb and Mashrek form 
natural sub-regions within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which 
covers the economies of the Arab League (Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE, and Yemen), Iran and Israel.  
 
This part of the research focuses on the Mashrek sub-region which includes Jordan, 
where the ASEZ is located, being the subject of this research. Although, politically it 
includes Egypt, for logistical and geographical reasons, the Mashrek sub-region 
under discussion has been redefined within the context of this research to cover only 
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. While, all these 
countries are located in Asia, Egypt is located in Africa. Similarly, several ports 
within this sub-region, except for Egypt, share potentially overlapping hinterland 
markets. Muller-Jentsch (2002) identifies that economic centers in Jordan and Syria 
are closer to foreign rather than domestic ports. Amman and Damascus are closer to 
the ports of Gaza, Ashdod and Beirut on the Mediterranean than the ports of Aqaba 
on the Red Sea and Latakia on the Mediterranean.  
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 Figure 2.1 Highlight of the defined Mashrek countries  
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/middleeast_ref01.pdf 
 
2.2.1 Economic & Political Background 
 
Economic cooperation within the Mashrek region has been very limited due to 
political reasons and different economic policies in the countries of the region. While 
the Arab-Israeli conflict prevented any cooperation with Israel, the various levels of 
economic protectionism policies limited cooperation among Mashrek Arab countries.   
 
Although the Mashrek sub-region has not been able to materialize the advantages of 
economic growth and regional integration due to political instability, currently, the 
region is undergoing international political efforts to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
bring stability, peace and prosperity to the region. The Copenhagen Action Plan, an 
important international political initiative adopted by the countries of the region in 
November 1993, aims at promoting regional economic development in the region 
and addresses the issues of infrastructure, trade, finance and tourism. Through this 
plan, countries of the region will work to encourage the free movement of people, 
goods, services, capital and information among the partners in the region; to 
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stimulate economic development and to reduce regional economic disparities; to 
promote the region's integration in global markets to fully exploit respective 
advantages by promoting regional trade, facilitating investment and developing 
infrastructure. (Ezrahi, 2003) 
 
In principle, the peace process in the Middle East is expected to remove political 
constraints and therefore facilitating higher economic growth. Accordingly, the peace 
agreements between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority with Israel open the door 
for initiating a regional economic cooperation (Bar-El, 2003). Similarly, Ezrahi 
(2003) reports that global trends of globalization, liberalisation and regionalism 
coupled with the settlement of political disputes will be reflected in the Middle East 
and therefore leading to economic co-operation between region countries. 
 
Accordingly, the Europe - Mediterranean Partnership initiative is widely recognised 
as the proper tool which will speed the integration of the region into the international 
economy; therefore creating a favourable environment for linkages across the 
region’s markets and production systems, which will result in regional liberalisation 
and cooperation on transport infrastructure projects and facilities (Petri, 1997). 
 
Similarly, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) efforts will continue to liberalize 
and facilitate cross-border trade worldwide (UNCTAD, 2002). Currently two 
Mashrek economies: Jordan and Israel are members in the WTO and other 
economies are in an ongoing negotiations process, which ensures the region’s 
commitment to adhere to WTO standards, particularly toward trade policy reforms 
and liberalization along the global WTO track.  
 
However, in order to capture the economic benefits of the Euro-Mediterranean free 
trade agreements on both regional and international levels, the countries of the region 
need to eliminate the non-tariff barriers and to improve the transport efficiency. 
Micco (2003) shows that reduction in artificial trade barriers has emphasized the 
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importance of transport costs as a remaining barrier to trade. However, the 
“Barcelona Declaration” acknowledges the importance of transport sector reforms, 
particularly the removal of all inefficiencies in the regional transport network.  
 
2.2.2 Mashrek Economies 
 
The Mashrek sub-region is unique in its economic and social structure. To large 
extent, the region consists of a culturally homogenous group of small economies with 
considerable differences in their levels of economic development and structure in 
some cases. Mashrek has a population of 36.4 million with a total Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of $ 154.5 billion. In 2002, the region exported a total of $ 51.55 
billion and imported a total of $ 67.35 billion.  Although each of the region’s 
economies has its own characteristics, they are united in their need of economic 
improvement and technological advancement. Further, most of Mashrek countries 
are under-represented in manufacturing relative to economies with similar economic 
characteristics. Table 2.1 charts demographic, economic indicators in the region and 
reflects to some extent the economic disparities and how most economies in the 
region still operate below their potentials and therefore, not taking full advantage of 
the opportunities that the global economy has to offer. 
 
Table 2.1 Economic indicators in Mashrek countries (2002) 
Indicator Jordan Lebanon Syria Israel 
West Bank & 
Gaza TOTAL 
GDP ($ billion) 9.30 17.30 20.80 103.70 3.40 154.50
Population (million) 5.20 4.40 17.00 6.60 3.20 36.40
Per capita GPD ($) 1788.00 3932.00 1224.00 15712.00 1062.00   
Imports ($ billion ) 5.30 7.08 5.89 47.50 1.58 67.35
Exports ($ billion ) 2.50 2.41 7.64 38.58 0.42 51.55
Source: The World Bank Group – World Development Indicators Database, April 2004. 
 
Many of these economies remain specialized in raw material exports and labour 
intensive low skilled manufactures. Therefore, they risk becoming marginalized in 
the global economy as the globalization of goods and capital markets accelerates. 
Alternatively, other economies in the region are successfully advancing on the ladder 
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of dynamic comparative advantage toward human capital and technology-intensive 
goods (Muller-Jentsch, 2002).  
 
Therefore, due to existence of significant differences in the economic structure of the 
region’s economies, many writers argued against the idea of regional integration. 
They believe that opening economic borders between countries with imbalance of 
economic powers may lead to an “economic colonization” process (Heller, 1994) 
(Lawrence, 1995). While this situation may evolve only in case of full regional 
integration, such condition is hardly expected in the short-medium term. Yet, the 
same writers share with other pro-integration writers (Ezrahi, 2003) that for the 
immediate future, specific patterns of cooperation should be preferred to a general 
integration approach. Cooperation must start with transport infrastructure facilities 
and removal of trade barriers to improve the logistics efficiency in the region  
 
2.2.3 Transport and Trade flows 
 
There exists a strong relationship between economic development and trade growth. 
The improvement in a country’s external trade is directly related to economic 
development, which is reflected in the growth of the GDP. According to  Drewry 
(2000) GDP and containerised trade are directly related. Therefore, GDP can be used 
as an economic indicator for forecasting the cargo growth in the region. Since 
demand for containerisation or transport logistics in general is a derived demand 
from international trade of containerized cargo then ultimately it is affected by world 
economic and political developments. 
 
Table 2.2 Real GDP growth in Mashrek countries between (1992-2002) 
GDP (US$ billion) 
Growth '92-'02 Country 1992 2001 2002 
Total Avg. Yr. 
Growth  
'01-'02 
Jordan 5.4 8.8 9.3 72% 7% 6% 
Lebanon 5.5 16.7 17.3 215% 21% 4% 
Syria 13.3 19.5 21.9 65% 6% 12% 
Israel 65.8 112.7 103.7 58% 6% -8% 
WB & Gaza n/a 4.0 3.4 n/a n/a -15% 
Source: The World Bank Group – World Development Indicators Database, April 2004. 
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Table 2.2 which registers the growth rates of the region’s GDP between 1992 and 
2002 shows that during the last decade the Mashrek countries’ GDP registered a 
remarkable growth rates, which corresponds with the growth in region’s demand for 
trade and ultimately demand for transport services.  
 
Similarly, during the past decade containerised transport witnessed a significant 
growth in all countries of the region, which have developed the required 
infrastructure for this type of transport. Table 2.3 compares the container traffic in 
the region in 1996 with 2002. It also calculates an important indicator for the 
penetration of containers in certain markets by calculating the number of Twenty 
Equivalent Unit (TEU) per million dollars of GDP (Drewry, 2000). While Jordan has 
the highest ratio (30) the other countries are also showing good ratios in international 
benchmarking standards.  
 
Table 2.3 Container traffic growth rates in Mashrek countries between (1996-2002) 
Country 1996 (TEU) 2002 (TEU)  '96-'02 Growth % 
TEU/$mGDP 
(2002) 
Jordan 139,317 277,307 99% 30 
Lebanon 259,247 298,876 15% 17 
Syria 150,000 257,586 72% 12 
Israel 989,937 1,461,000 48% 14 
Source: Containerisation International Yearbooks 1999 & 2004.  
 
On the other hand, the vast majority of cross-border trade in the Mashrek region is 
seaborne, especially for economies with limited overland cross-border access due to 
its geopolitical location. Jordan on the other hand, which is the only country in this 
region without access to the Mediterranean, depends on road haulage for more than 
60% of its imports by weight. Furthermore, the region’s trade reflects imbalance 
between imports (mainly processed goods and consumer products) and exports 
(mostly commodities). While Jordan and Syria’s exports by sea (phosphate in Jordan 
and oil in Syria) are higher than thier imports, Lebanon and Israel have the reverse 
situation. In Jordan, the share of phosphates and other minerals accounted for 54 
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percent of the country’s total seaborne trade, while in Syria oil and oil derivatives 
made up to 69 percent of maritime traffic.  
 
Table 2.4 Maritime Transport Flow in Mashrek countries (2000) 
Country Inbound (000 tons) Out-bound (000 tons) 
Inbound as % of 
Out-bound 
Jordan 5,360 7,193 134% 
Lebanon 5,195 352 7% 
Syria 8,959 20,705 231% 
Israel 29,196 13,866 47% 
Source: Eurostat (MED-Trans Database) 
 
Table 2.4 reflects the imbalance between the inbound and outbound maritime trade in 
Mashrek countries. These imbalances in the lop-sidedness of maritime transport 
flows, lead to considerable unused transport capacity and therefore differences in 
freight rates between out-bound and inbound traffic. 
 
2.3 Logistics in the region 
 
2.3.1 Background 
 
With today’s dynamic markets and increasingly changing technologies, companies 
must be flexible to respond rapidly to competition and market changes. Over the past 
two decades, hyper-competition led business cycles to develop various management 
tools and techniques to survive. Quality management, time-based competition, 
benchmarking, outsourcing, partnering, reengineering and change management are 
all examples of such instruments. The ultimate goal is to “deliver greater value to 
customers or create compatible value at a lower cost, or do both”  (Porter, 1996, 
p.62). Eventually, it was realized that differences in cost derive from the large 
number of activities performed from creating the product or service up to delivering 
it to the customer, that is the supply chain. Therefore, whoever manages these 
activities and their flow more effectively and efficiently will gain the cost advantage 
and then the competitive lead. This breakdown of activities paralleled with the 
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introduction of containers and the revolution in the information and communication 
technologies resulted in the emergence of logistics and multimodal transport as a 
competitive strategic management tool, which enables enterprises to achieve the cost 
leadership. Later with the explosive expansion of international trade, global 
outsourcing of manufacturing and the introduction of the just in time production, 
transport logistics gained increased importance and became an integral part of the 
production process.  
 
Although transport logistics advantages have been recognized and acquired by many 
countries around the world over the past two decades, it is only until recently 
Mashrek economies began to pay attention to this process and its requirements. In 
fact, Mashrek countries could not capture the full advantages derived from an 
efficient transport logistics system due to administrative and political barriers. Land 
borders between Lebanon and Israel and between Syrian and Israel are closed due to 
political conflicts. Similarly, Syrian law prohibits imports to the country through 
foreign ports (Muller-Jentsch, 2002). 
 
Accordingly maybe the “imports freight costs macroeconomic indicator for transport 
sector efficiency” can be the best tool to demonstrates that most of Mashrek 
countries suffer from inefficient transport organization and facilities, poor utilization 
of assets and weak management practices. Table 2.5 provides estimates of total 
freight costs for imports and the percentage of total imports value of the Mashrek 
countries, as per United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
figures (Muller-Jentsh, 2002). 
 
  Table 2.5 Estimates of freight costs for imports in Mashrek countries (2000) 
Country 
Value of imports (CIF) 
($ billion) 
Freight Costs of imports 
($ million) 
Freight Costs as % 
of imports 
Jordan 4.5 574 12.8 %  
Lebanon 6.2 657 10.6 % 
Syria 5.3 687 13.0 % 
Israel 36.8 2993 8.1 % 
WB & Gaza n/a n/a n/a 
  Source: UNCTAD  
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With 7-8% international best practice benchmarks, it is quite clear from the figures in 
Table 2.5 that (aside from Israel) Mashrek countries could save freight costs of up to 
2-4% ($0.3-0.7 billion) of their total trade value if their transport logistics system 
were more efficient. Therefore, Mashrek countries, which are poorly integrated in the 
international supply chain, still have large potential gains from transport sector 
reforms that ultimately may lead to considerable improvement in their international 
competitiveness. Certainly, the fact that supply chain is increasingly managed as an 
integrated system underlines the importance of the efficiency and integration of the 
intermodal transport chain components. Therefore, the efficiency of transport 
logistics, which is crucial for the commercial success of individual enterprise, is a 
vital determinant for the Mashrek countries’ international competitiveness. 
 
Simply, the challenge facing the Mashrek region is not to expand the physical 
logistics infrastructure, but to upgrade and improve the logistics efficiency through 
policy reforms. Muller-Jentsh (2002) emphasizes that in many cases policy reforms 
could increase the efficiency of transport logistics and achieve the same effect as 
physical infrastructure expansion, but at much lower cost. For example, a study 
conducted by the Central American business school INCAE, on a Central American 
Logistics Corridor, revealed that lack of physical infrastructure was not the reason 
behind the bottlenecks, but the cumbersome border procedures and regulations, 
which restrained competition in road haulage and the development of a logistics 
industry (ESCAP, 2002). 
 
As mentioned earlier demand for transport services is derived from demand for trade 
and therefore trade represents the demand side in this market. However, the supply 
side is represented by the quantity and quality of the transport infrastructure and 
facilities. Therefore, defining the available logistics infrastructure in the region 
remains necessary to understand how these two forces (demand and supply) 
determine the transport market in the region. Additionally, to show how intermodal 
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nodes and international trade corridors in each country can integrate together to form 
the region’s multimodal transport network.  
 
2.3.2  Logistics infrastructure 
 
“Since a chain is only as strong as its weakest link”, reliable and cost-efficient 
transport logistics requires efficient physical transport infrastructure. Although 
transport logistics are the ultimate output of the different transport means, port, rail, 
road and airport infrastructure and services are the essential intermediate inputs. 
Smooth hinterlands connection, effective cross-border procedures and professional 
management of the whole process are significant factors for the success of 
intermodal nodes, particularly ports. This importance stems from the close 
relationship between infrastructure quality and transport cost. Many economists have 
found that quality of logistics infrastructure has an inverse relationship with transport 
cost. Guasch and Kogan (2001) noticed in their cross-country comparison study that 
low quality of infrastructure is a highly possible reason for the high inventory levels 
in low-income countries. 
 
Compared with many other third world nations, Mashrek countries enjoy a good 
physical infrastructure for trade and travel. In general the region’s roads, railways, 
airports and ports are considered adequate and sufficient. The following parts explain 
briefly the available transport infrastructure and platforms in Mashrek region.  
 
2.3.2.1  Ports 
 
Ports are the key intermodal nodes and entry points for trade into most Mashrek 
countries. Hence, the region enjoys several outlets on Mediterranean and Red Sea.  
 
Jordan: Aqaba Port is Jordan’s only port on the Red Sea with facilities and berths for 
all kinds of cargo including a container terminal. Port installations and facilities 
are explained in further details later. 
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Lebanon: Beirut Port is Lebanon’s primary commercial port and has a total of 890 
meter of container quay with depths ranging from 10.5-13 meters in addition to a 
new container terminal with 600 meter quay and 15.5 meter water depth (Drewry, 
2000). It also includes other general cargo quays with depths ranging from 8-10.5 
meter (ESCWA, 2003). Currently, the port is undergoing a second privatization 
process after Dubai Port Authority (DPA) withdrew from a new container 
terminal 20 year concession contract (Daily Star, 2004, July 3). Table 2.6 lists the 
ports in the Mashrek region with total tons and TEUs handled in 2003. 
 
Table 2.6 Ports in the Mashrek region   
Country Port/s Location 
2003 Total 
Throughput  
('000Tons) 
2003 Total 
Throughput 
('000TEUs) 
Jordan Aqaba Red Sea (north)  17,847 303 
Lebanon Beirut Mediterranean (east) 5,219 * 299 *  
  Triboli Mediterranean (east) n/a 0 
Syria Lattakia Mediterranean (east) 4,867 257 
  Tartous Mediterranean (east) 5,562 0 
  Banias Mediterranean (east) n/a 0 
Israel Haifa Mediterranean (east) 18,805 1,014 
  Ashdod Mediterranean (east) 14,041 514 
  Eilat Red Sea (north)  2,104 22 
WB & Gaza Gaza Mediterranean (east) n/a 0 
     Source: various sources including ports’ websites.   * 2002 traffic. 
 
Syria: Lattakia is Syria’s primary commercial port for containers and general cargo 
while the southern port of Tartous is for dry bulk. Banias Port is dedicated only to 
the country’s exports of crude oil. Some of these ports are now undergoing a 
massive rehabilitation and modernisation operations, particularly the container 
facilities. Recently the European Investment Bank has signed a 50 million Euro 
loan agreement to finance the development and modernization of Tartus Port.  
Isreal: Haifa is Israel’s main commercial port for containers and grains and the 
southern port of Ashdod is also for containers, general and bulk cargo. While 
these two ports are on the Mediterranean, Israel’s third commercial port is the 
small Eilat Port on the Red Sea for dry and liquid bulk cargoes mainly. 
The West Bank and Gaza: The port of Gaza is in planning stages and expected to 
play an important role in region’s the trade once full peace and stability prevail.  
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However, ports in the Mashrek region are characterized by being close to each other 
and share potentially overlapping hinterlands. Syria’s Tartous and Lebanon’s Beirut 
ports are both within 100 km radius of common borders.  Meanwhile, for most ports, 
political and administrative barriers prevent inter-port competition and cross-country 
optimization of logistics flows within the region. While borders between several 
countries in the region are closed, other countries on the other hand prohibit their 
imports and or exports to be processed through foreign ports.  
 
2.3.2.2  Railways 
 
Although railways cannot provide door-to-door service, they have a potential cost 
advantage for long-haul traffic. All Mashrek countries have railroad networks but 
with varying standards and functioning statues. Mostly the freight transported by 
railways in Mashrek is dry bulk cargo (raw material and grains). 
 
Jordan: The 788 km two railway services in Jordan use a narrow gauge (1.05 meter) 
track. The Hijazi Railway, which connects Amman with Damascus in Syria, 
transports freight and passengers while the Aqaba Railway is only for freight, 
specifically phosphates from the mines to Aqaba Port.  
Lebanon: used to have a 407 km functioning railway network, but due to destruction 
and obsolescence the system is no longer in use.  However, the network consists 
of two gauge tracks in different parts and connects the north port of Tripoli with 
Beirut and extends to Damascus in Syria. 
Syria: Two railway systems exist in Syria; the old 318 km narrow gauge track (1.05 
meter) Hijaz Railway, which connects Damascus with Amman in Jordan and 
Beirut in Lebanon, and the 2425 km standard gauge track (1.435 meter) Syrian 
Railway, which connects ports of Lattakia and Tartous on west coast with 
industrial centers and all major cities, primarily the heavily populated and extends 
up to the Iraqi and Turkish borders. This network, which was completed in the 
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mid 1970s resulted in a considerable rise in traffic between ports and hinterlands. 
The rail transport in Syria is used for cargo (mostly raw materials) and passengers. 
Isreal: Likewise, the 610 km railway network connects the ports of Haifa and 
Ashdod with major cities and industrial centers mostly in the central and west 
parts of the country. The railway transports passengers and containers in addition 
to other bulk cargoes. 
The West Bank and Gaza: At the present no railway network exists in Gaza. 
 
Clearly, cross border rail traffic between countries of the region is very limited and 
hampered by the diversity of track gauge. While Lebanon and Syria are unable to 
utilize the connection between the two countries, limited scale traffic exist between 
Jordan and Syria using an old narrow gauge railway system. Therefore, with such 
underutilization of rail transport, the region’s trade is deprived of capturing the cost 
advantage of this transport mode. Certainly lack of modernisation and 
underinvestment are the main reasons for this shortage in the supply side of this 
important transport infrastructure. However, sooner or later the region will realise the 
need for a regional railway network as a viable solution for relieving road 
congestion, reducing road accidents and protecting the environment. Certainly, 
harmonised standards and technical specifications are a must in order for the region 
to build a regional railway network. 
 
2.3.2.3  Roads 
 
The roads and highways network in all Mashrek countries is a reasonably well-kept 
network of paved arterial roads connecting its major cities and linking neighbouring 
countries in most cases. 
 
Jordan: The most important corridors in Jordan are the north-south route between the 
port city of Aqaba and Iraq and Syria borders besides the east-west route between 
Saudi Arabia and Israel and West Bank borders. These corridors provide Jordan 
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with connections with the region and beyond. Interestingly, Jordan is the only 
country in the region, which has open cross-border movements with all its 
bordering neighbours. 
Lebanon: There are three main routes each spreading out from Beirut: a highway to 
Damascus, a road to Lebanon’s second largest port city of Tripoli and the road to 
the southern part of the country. In principle the Beirut-Damascus route is the 
main corridor, which provides the country with linkages, through Syria to the 
region’s network of roads and highways. 
Syria: The main corridors in the country are the north-south between the Turkish 
and Jordanian borders and the east-west between port cities and the Iraqi border. 
Another important road connection is between Damascus and Beirut. These 
corridors provide the industrial and commercial centers and all cities with a 
connection to national, regional and international routes.  
Isreal: Aside from the recently established west-east corridor between Jordan and 
Israel, most of the roads and highways in Israel are local linkages. An important 
highway for Israel is the north-south route between the port city Eilat and Tel-
Aviv, which was used heavily during the closure of the Suez Canal. 
The West Bank and Gaza: There are two main corridors; one connecting the West 
Bank with Jordan and the other with Israel. However, due to political unrest the 
infrastructure is still below the required levels. 
 
2.3.2.4  Airports 
 
Like ports, airport infrastructure and services are essential intermediate inputs in the 
air transport industry. Airports have an important impact on the air transport costs. 
For example, costs in and around airport charges and ground handling charges 
account for 24 percent of the total airline cost in Europe (AEA, 1998) and up to 10 
percent on worldwide average bases (IATA, 2004).  In Mashrek most countries have 
international, regional and local airports but with different levels of traffic 
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movements and services. All international airports in the region are served by wide 
network of airlines, which provides connections to most destinations in the world.   
 
Jordan: Queen Alia International Airport in Amman is the main airport in Jordan and 
King Hussein Airport is a regional airport in the ASEZ. The other regional airport 
is located also in Amman.     
 
Table 2.7 Air traffic in Mashrek countries  (1999-2000) 
 Passengers Country 
Domestic International Total 
Share of Main 
Airport in Total 
Passengers (%) 
Total Air-
Freight (Tons) 
Jordan 73,795 2,436,292 2,510,087 92% 85,620
Lebanon 0 1,997,103 1,997,103 100% 59,243
Syria 163,296 1,713,965 1,877,261 83% 31,077
Israel 1,128,734 8,734,100 9,862,834 85% 342,799
WB & Gaza 0 88,009 88,009 100% 245
     Source: Eurostat (MED-Trans Database) 
 
Lebanon: Beirut International Airport is the major and only airport in Lebanon.  
Syria: There are three international airports in Syria: Damascus, Aleppo and the port 
city Lattakia. Also there are two national airports in Deir Ezzor and Qamishli. 
Isreal: Likewise, Israel has only one international airport and a small national airport 
in the port city of Eilat. 
West Bank and Gaza: There is one regional airport in Gaza.  
 
Table 2.7 shows the total air traffic for passengers and freight in the Mashrek 
countries in 1999-2000. Clearly, for a small region like the Mashre the available air 
transport infrastructure is sufficient. However, in order to integrate this important 
mode of transport and the other modes into a regional multimodal transport network 
for both passengers and freight many improvements need to take place.  Therefore, 
the launch of the “Euro-Mediterranean Transport Forum” in 1998 is an important 
project, which aims at developing, through cooperation a multimodal air-sea 
transport system in the Mediterranean region including the Mashrek countries. 
Priority is given to the improvement and modernization of the ports and airports, the 
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elimination of restrictions and bottlenecks, the simplification of administrative 
procedures and the adoption of harmonized systems of management of the traffic. 
 
2.3.2.5  Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) 
 
Information and communication technologies are no less important infrastructure 
than the previous physical components in the development of an effective and 
efficient transport logistics industry. Today this element is changing the way in 
which international trade and transport are concluded (UNCTAD, 2003). Similarly, 
Internet is becoming a popular tool in various transport activities and trade 
transactions. Electronic commerce is booming and becoming a common practice; 
thus having a significant impact on logistics.  
 
In the Mashrek region, most countries have made great strides in developing their 
communications and information technology sectors. Internet and mobile phones are 
now widely available in the region. In some countries like Jordan and Lebanon, the 
mobile phones have exceeded the landline fixed phones. However, the utilization of 
these technologies in transport activities is still very low in most countries of the 
region. While both Jordan and Lebanon implemented UNCTAD’s Automated 
System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA), ports in both countries have not yet 
introduced computerisation into their operations and activities.  
 
Evidently countries of the region possess the basic infrastructure needed for a 
successful logistics and multimodal transport industry. Meanwhile, political and 
administrative barriers prevent the region from the utilization of these resources to 
build a cost efficient regional multimodal transport network.  
 
Still aware of all these political constraints but all countries are improving and 
modernising their infrastructure and examining the missing links and connections 
which can enhance competitiveness of their logistics capabilities. 
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2.3.3  Missing logistics links and improvements 
 
However, creating an efficient multimodal transport network requires complete links 
between the different nodes and economic centers and heavily populated areas. 
Therefore, several transport infrastructure projects have been constructed or are 
under planning to improve the effectiveness of multimodal network in the region. 
  
Within the context of the peace process in the region, several countries in the 
Mashrek region have explored and proposed various logistics infrastructure projects 
in order to improve their ports’ and airports’ hinterlands in the region. These projects 
include a 100 km highway from Latakia to Ariha (MEED, 8 December 2000) and an 
extension of railway connection from Haifa to major hinterlands in Syria and Jordan, 
particularly to Aqaba Port on the Red Sea.  Furthermore, during a workshop on 
Regional Road Infrastructure, organised by the Commission of the European Union 
in October 1994 in Cairo with international participation, certain projects were 
selected as priority measures for improving “regional/international” road transport 
network in the area. These projects included a ring road in the vicinity of 
Aqaba/Eilat/Rass El Naqab, Sinai road corridors, road from Haifa to Irbid and 
eastwards and Jordan River Bridges with access roads linking the northern parts of 
Jordan and Israel. The last two projects have been accomplished and traffic between 
Jordan and Israel and the West Bank is rising as a result.  
 
Similarly, the Integrated Transport System in Arab Mashrek by the United Nation 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) demonstrates another 
effort toward defining a regional backbone-network of roads that will increase traffic 
flow efficiency.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3.  LOGISTICS FACILITIES IN AQABA SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE  
 
The objective of this section is to describe the logistics environment in the ASEZ and 
the relevance of logistics activities in the zone to the economy from a technical and 
strategic point of view. Similarly, potential logistics opportunities will be highlighted 
and at the same time any shortages or deficiencies will be pointed out. As transport 
and logistics activities are mainly linked with trade, it is important to emphasize 
Jordan’s economic policy in order to evaluate the importance of cross-border trade. 
 
3.1  Jordan’s Economic Policy 
  
Situated at the Middle East’s north-south and east-west trade routes, Jordan has a 
distinct geographical advantage as a trade and transport hub for the region. 
Considering its central location, with Saudi Arabia and Gulf States to the south and 
southeast and Egypt to the southwest, Syria and Lebanon to the north, the West Bank 
and Gaza and Israel to the west and Iraq to the east, Jordan is ideally positioned to 
accommodate an expanding and increasing transit market for goods destined to 
neighbouring countries (World Bank, 2004).  
 
Jordan is a relatively small economy with an area of 89210 sq. km and 5.2 million 
inhabitants. In 2002, the country’s GDP reached JD 6.6 billion (approximately US$ 
9.3 billion) with JD 1238 per capita GDP (US$ 1744). Domestic exports have been 
growing in the past 5 years at varying percentages from JD 1.05 billion (US$ 1.5 
billion) in 1998 to JD1.6 billion (US$ 2.3 billion) in 2003 (40 percent growth).  
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Figure 3.1 Jordan’s Foreign Trade (2000 – 2003) 
Source: Jordan Export Development and Commercial Centers Corporation (JEDCO). 
 
 Jordan’s commitment to a more liberalized regime and to transferring the country 
into a regional trade and transport hub is evidenced by the country’s regional and 
international trade agreements. With the ratification of the Jordanian Parliament on 
the Law of Jordan’s Accession to the WTO on February 24, 2000, Jordan became 
officially the 136 WTO Member on April 11, 2000. Similarly, with the aim of 
strengthening the bonds of economic relations and cooperation between the two 
countries, promoting economic growth and investment opportunities and eventually 
raising the capacity and international competitiveness of goods and services, on 
October 24, 2000 Jordan and the United States of America signed an agreement to 
establish a FTA between the two countries. This agreement makes Jordan the fourth 
country in the world to have such economic partnership with the US after Canada, 
Mexico and Israel. Likewise, in 1998, Jordan was among the 18 members of the 
Arab League who initiated the creation of the Greater Arab FTA by 2008 and tariff 
dismantling has started. In the same way, the Association Agreement between Jordan 
and the European Union (EU), which entered into force on May 1, 2002 aims to 
establish a free trade area between Jordan and the EU countries by the year 2010. 
Again the free trade agreement signed on June 21, 2001, between Jordan and the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland) aims to create favourable conditions for the development of trade and to 
encourage economic cooperation and integration between Jordan and the EFTA 
states. These agreements clearly demonstrate the country’s responsibility toward 
cross-border trade liberalization.    
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3.2  Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) 
   
Progressively, in its efforts to integrate into the global trading system and capitalize 
the country’s geographical advantage, in mid February 2001, the Government of 
Jordan decided to declare the whole city of Aqaba, where country’s only port, as a 
duty free Special Economic Zone. The ASEZ, which covers approximately 375 
square kilometres, is strategically situated at the crossroads of four countries. 
Located on the Gulf of Aqaba on the northern end of the Red Sea, and extending to 
the land borders of Saudi Arabia and Israel and the territorial waters of Egypt, ASEZ 
enjoys a locational advantage to develop and become a logistics and distribution 
center for the nearby markets in these countries.  
 
One of the main objectives of this project is to develop the zone to become an 
advanced multi-modal transport and logistics centre through maximizing the 
utilization of the four transport logistics platforms available in the zone: deep water 
port of Aqaba, King Hussien’s international airport, network of national and regional 
highway linkages and the railway link with major production site in the country. 
 
To this end, the following part of the study aims at highlighting the current logistics 
physical infrastructure in ASEZ, its quality and its significance to the national and 
other economies in the region.  
 
3.2.1   Maritime Transport Infrastructure 
 
It has been long established that countries with access to the sea have better chances 
to develop faster than those who do not. While having sea access by itself is an 
advantage, it is the efficiency of maritime transport infrastructure that determines the 
level of such advantage. Ports, which provide such physical infrastructure, are 
critical nodes in intermodal transport chains. In the ASEZ, the maritime 
infrastructure is represented mainly in the diversified port operations and activities. 
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3.2.1.1  The Aqaba Port: 
 
The Aqaba port, which was established in 1952 as the first logistical platform in the 
city, has developed and become a center for international trade for Jordan and other 
countries in the region. Being the country’s only deep seaport, Aqaba port gained a 
special strategic importance and attention, which enabled the port to expand to 
provide a diversified range of commodities and activities.  Now Aqaba Port consists 
of three ports; Main, Container and Industrial ports. The logistical facilities in the 
port ranging from berths and various warehouse to a container terminal “can 
generally be classified as modern and sufficient” (GOPA, 1996, p.72).  
 
3.2.1.2   Port’s Logistical Facilities 
Aqaba port activities are centred round three separate installations:  
 
1. The Main Port, which was the 
first constructed facility, 
comprises twelve general and 
bulk cargo berths of draft 
alongside ranging from 4-15 
meters. After the expansion of 
the city this port has become a 
source of environmental and 
social difficulties to the city.  
 Figure 3.2 Main Port after development-ASEZ 
 Source: http://www.aqabazone.com/Master/Ports.html# 
Therefore, a work plan is underway to relocate the activities of this port to other 
ports areas outside the city and transform this location into a cruise and leisure 
facility for tourism purposes. This task has been one of the main goals for 
establishing the ASEZ. In their final report about the ASEZ Master Plan, Wilbur 
(2001, p.1) stated “the underlying goal for this section of the Master Plan is to 
provide a land utilization plan for the port of Aqaba that will serve Jordan for at 
least next 20 years”.  
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2. The Container Port which is 
located between the Main and 
Industrial ports, comprises a 
container terminal, RO-RO 
berth, loading platform/dolphin 
arrangement for cement 
exports and two floating berths; 
one for bulk rice and the other 
for passengers/ferries.   
Figure 3.3 Container Terminal - ASEZ 
Source: http://www.aqabazone.com/Master/Ports.html# 
 
Similarly, the container terminal has a total of 540 meters straight quay-line with 
water depths ranging from 15-20 meters.  
 
3. The Industrial Port comprises three wharfs; an “L” configuration fertilizers jetty 
with 230 meters seaward berth (west) used for exports of potash and fertilizers 
and 190 meters landward berth (east) used for imports of sulphur and other bulk 
cargo, an oil jetty composed of jetty heads, four berthing dolphins, four mooring 
dolphins and an approach jetty, Timber berth located between the oil and 
fertilizers jetties used for the adjacent timber factory. Appendix A identifies the 
berthing facilities and dimensions at the three ports.  
 
 3.2.1.3   Port’s Operations 
 
The port activities grew sharply in the 1980s and peaked in 1988 at about 20 million 
tons. However, following the Gulf Crisis in 1990 a drastic drop in the cargo flow 
volumes severely affected the port activities. In 1995 the port handled about 11 
million tons of cargo, which included bulk phosphates, potash, fertilizers and other 
bulk exports, transhipment goods and a high portion of domestic imports.  
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Aqaba Port, which is owned and operated by the Government, has been so far a 
traditional handling port whereby very minimum value added activities have 
developed. In fact, one of the main reasons behind the establishment of the Special 
Economic Zone in Aqaba is to develop the zone to become a logistics center by 
providing value added logistics activities in order to generate considerable economic 
growth. Therefore, unless the zone succeeds in developing local value-added 
activities linked to transit cargo or in developing an effective local industrial and 
logistics cluster, the economic impact will remain very limited and “the geographical 
dispersion of economic effects is very apparent” (Notteboom, 2002, p.17). 
 
However, in order to achieve these goals, the Aqaba Special Economic Zone 
Authority (ASEZA), as the government body entrusted to manage the ASEZ, 
contracted APM Terminals to operate and manage the Port of Aqaba Container 
Terminal. The two year concession, which started officially on July 1st 2004, “may 
be extended to further 25 years, if both parties are satisfied with the initial trial 
period” (Thomas, 2004 March 8, p.14). Under this agreement APM Terminals Jordan 
will implement a number of upgrades to the terminal including new updated 
equipment, terminal operating and financial accounting systems and other 
infrastructure development. 
 
3.2.1.4  The Role of Aqaba Port 
 
Since the sharp drop in port traffic, many studies have been made to improve the port 
activities and transport sector in Jordan as a whole. Within the scope of all these 
studies, which were performed by reputable international consulting bodies, the 
future role of Aqaba Port was a major point of concern. Surprisingly, the outcomes 
of these studies reflected different opinions concerning this role. A comprehensive 
study on the “Improvement Plan of the Port of Aqaba in The Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan” by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (February 1996, p.85) 
concluded that “Port of Aqaba already has a lot of roles and functions. In addition, 
with the progress of the peace process in the Middle East, the port is to enjoy much 
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prosperity”. The study proposed a development plan in order to meet future growth. 
Likewise, another “Diagnostic Study on Goods Trade and Transport Facilitation” by 
the European Consortium GOPA Consultants and DOXIADIS Associates and 
BCOEM in association with a local Jordanian consulting firm concluded that “Port 
of Aqaba plays a key role in Jordan’s current and future transport sector 
development”. The study also emphasised the positive impact of the peace process in 
generating “additional freight flows to and from Israel via Aqaba” and pointed out 
that the “future role of the port should be to facilitate trade and transport activities 
especially to the south-east Asia countries”. (April 1996, p.72). 
 
On the other hand, the most recent study on “Aqaba, Jordan Special Economic Zone 
Master Plan” by the US Consortium Wilbur Smith Associates, Moffatt and Nichol 
and Gensler in association with local Jordanian consulting firm reported in their final 
report (March 2001, p.2.8) that “Port of Aqaba is located in a non-strategic region 
from a standpoint of intermodal access to other countries” and therefore, “Aqaba is 
not seen as a major transit port for non-Jordanian cargoes”.  
 
While some studies claimed that changes in the geo-political scene in the Middle 
East will lead to changes in the regional patterns of transport and trade, non of these 
studies used any microeconomic theoretical or empirical approach to support their 
conclusions about the future transport demand on Aqaba Port or why such changes 
are expected or which markets will be affected. Nevertheless, the consultants’ 
conclusions were based on informal methods of analyzing the port’s historical cargo 
traffic such as experts’ judgement,  use of scenarios and building up their own 
prospects and assessments of the economic and political future of the region. 
 
However, such informal judgments, which do not allow for development and tests of 
hypotheses, may also not allow third parties to understand the relative importance of 
the key factors and assumptions relied upon, and how total cost might change if any 
or all of the underlying variables change.  
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Consequently, this research, which uses a simple formal method that utilizes a simple 
econometric approach to identify the port’s potential in generating transport demand 
for the Aqaba Port, particularly for containerized cargo, is viewed as a needed effort 
that complements the missing research about the potential role of Aqaba Port thus, 
the ASEZ in the region. 
 
Table 3.1  Total Jordanian Exports and Imports by Mode of Transport (2002) 
EXPORTS  IMPORTS  
TOTAL EXPORTS & 
IMPORTS 
MODE OF 
TRANSPORT TON 
Share of 
Total 
Exports % TON 
Share of 
Total 
Imports % TON 
Share of 
Total 
Trade % 
Trucks 2,499,800 25.1% 7,469,700 71.60% 9,969,500 48.88%
Airplanes 8,700 0.1% 1,690 0.02% 10,390 0.05%
Vessels 7,456,600 74.8% 2,961,600 28.38% 10,418,200 51.07%
G. Total (Ton) 9,965,100 100% 10,432,990 100% 20,398,090 100%
Source: Ministry of Transport (Jordan) 
 
On the other hand, the importance of Aqaba Port on the national level can be viewed 
from the port’s share of Jordan’s total imports and exports. As can be seen from 
Table 3.1 that more than 50% of Jordan’s foreign trade is seaborne trade (75% 
exports and 28% imports). However, the port’s importance has enhanced after the 
country began importing its needs of crude oil by sea following the 2003 Iraq war.   
 
Accordingly, Table 3.2 compares Aqaba Port’s traffic between years 2000-2003 and 
shows the jump in domestic imports from 4.37 million tons to 8.63 million tons 
(about 98% growth).  
 
Table 3.2  Cargo traffic via Aqaba Port (2000-2003) 
JORDAN CARGO (‘000,000 TON) TRANSIT CARGO (‘000,000 TON) 
YEAR INBOUND 
OUT-
BOUND TOTAL INBOUND 
OUT-
BOUND TOATL 
TOTAL 
CARGO 
HANDLED 
(000,000 TON)
2000 4.93 7.15 12.08 0.42 0.04 0.46 12.54
2001 4.61 7.76 12.37 0.64 0.03 0.67 13.04
2002 4.37 8.84 13.21 0.92 0.03 0.95 14.16
2003 8.63 8.20 16.83 0.98 0.04 1.02 17.85
Source: Aqaba Ports Corporation (Jordan) 
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3.2.2   Over-land Transport Infrastructure 
 
The over-land transport physical infrastructure in ASEZ consists mainly of an 
extensive highly important network of roads and highway linkages in addition to a 
very limited scope railway connection.   
 
3.2.2.1   Roads Network 
 
The roads network inside the ASEZ, which serves the zone and connects it with 
mainland and the neighbouring countries, is an integral part of the national network 
of highways. While ASEZ has direct road links with neighbouring Saudi Arabia and 
Israel, its links with hinterland markets in other countries like Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Israel and the West Bank and Gaza is through the country’s main network of 
highways. Therefore, it is necessary to highlight the national network of highways in 
order to understand its significance to the ASEZ. 
 
Jordan’s developed highway network comprises of 7360 km of roads of different 
levels of service (Ministry of Transport, 2003). Over 40% are classified as primary 
roads while the rest includes secondary and rural roads.  The network includes key 
strategic regional corridors; therefore, it is considered very important to international, 
regional and national trade and transport activities. A most recent study (World 
Bank, 2004) about the missing links in the road network reports that commercial 
truck traffic utilizing the major north-south and east-west corridors, connecting Saudi 
Arabia with Syria and Israel/West Bank with Iraq has increased considerably (5.8 
percent a year). In short, Jordan’s network, which offers good coverage supports the 
ASEZ’s road network and provides the zone with linkages to regional corridors, 
logistics platforms and commercial and industrial activities in the country.  
 
To demonstrate, the Dead Sea Highway (Route #65) and the Desert Highway (Route 
#15) link the port and airport inside ASEZ with the central and northern parts of 
Jordan, particularly the capital Amman and from there to the major highways leading 
to Syria, Iraq, the West Bank and Israel. Actually, the Dead Sea Highway connects 
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the port and the airport with the potash and chemicals industrial complex on the 
Dead Sea (a major source of imports and exports via the port). Likewise, the Desert 
Highway connects Aqaba Port with the phosphate mines site in the southern-central 
part of the country (also source of the largest share of exports via the port). 
 
 Figure 3.4 Jordan’s highway and railway networks  
  Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/jordan_pol_2004.jpg 
 
Similarly, the Jafr-Azraq highway (bypass on the Desert Highway – 100 km north of 
Aqaba) provides ASEZ with a direct link to Iraq and allows traffic service between 
the zone and Iraq directly rather than via Amman. Likewise, three primary roads 
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connect the zone to these links and neighbouring country borders; the Airport Road 
leads to both a bypass to the Israeli border and to the Dead Sea Highway, Amman 
Road leads to the Desert Highway and the Aqaba Coastal Road leads to the Saudi 
Arabia border.  These roads and highways coupled with other primary and secondary 
roads inside ASEZ form the backbone of the logistics activities in the zone and 
provide efficient connection between ASEZ and the domestic and transit markets.  
In fact, the port activities grew every time the network expanded and covered new 
hinterland markets. After the expansion and reconstruction of the national highway 
network in the mid 1970s, whereby more hinterland markets were covered, the ports 
activities grew considerably (from about 0.38 million tons in 1970 to about 6.6 
million tons in 1980). Similarly the rehabilitation and construction of the highway 
link with Iraq in the early 1980s, resulted in a significant growth in Aqaba port 
activities (from about 6.6 million tons in 1980 to about 20.1 million tons in 1988, 
which was the highest throughput the port has ever reached before the drop in traffic 
due to the Gulf Crisis in mid 1989). Annex B shows the historical cargo traffic via 
Aqaba Port from 1952 when the port was established up to 2003, and how these 
infrastructure developments reflected on considerable rise in port traffic.  
 
However, the road network in ASEZ and in Jordan in general is considered sufficient 
and can accommodate the transport demand for the next fifteen years. A capacity and 
sensitivity analysis by Wilbur Smith Associates (2001) revealed that “highway and 
road network show no capacity problems and expected to carry future north-south 
projected traffic up to 2020”. 
 
3.2.2.2   Railways Network 
 
Although a very important logistics backbone, rail transport in ASEZ is not fully 
utilized and limited to the movement of phosphates from areas about 300 km north of 
ASEZ. The single line of 295 km narrow gauge track, which dates back to the 
Ottoman Empire, is used for transporting phosphate rocks to Aqaba port for exports.  
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Surprisingly, when this service started its operations in 1975 after constructing a 117 
km link to the Aqaba Port, the declared objective was to transport imported goods 
from Aqaba Port to main consumption centers in the country in addition to 
transporting phosphate exports to the port. Since that date the service has not carried 
any imported goods at all. In fact, this situation represents a major shortage and 
under investment in the country’s transport logistics infrastructure and undermines 
the port’s competitiveness for distant markets.  
 
An improved low cost rail connection enhances the logistics infrastructure efficiency 
and enables the port to gain competitive edge and expand its hinterlands markets and 
generate growth to its region. Many container ports in the world benefited 
considerably from integrating their activities with railway networks. For example, 
Los Angeles and Long Beach ports gained a competitive advantage when the coast-
to-coast intermodal service was established.  Similarly, a study by the Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) emphasises the crucial role 
that intermodal strategies can play in expanding port markets. The study points out 
that “with nearly 80% of its container traffic being ultimately distributed across the 
US by a combination of rail and road” the port of Seattle succeeded in becoming a 
gateway port to hinterland markets through the US, which could never have used this 
port without the intermodal connections, particularly the rail. (ESCAP, 2003, p.17). 
 
It is clear that without a railway connection to transport the imported goods, 
specifically containers between Aqaba Port and hinterland markets, the ASEZ is in 
shortage of a major physical logistics infrastructure component. Needless to say, the 
need for rail transport for imports will become a social and environmental urgency in 
near far future. To illustrate, if the projected volume of more than 600,000 TEU 
throughput is reached within the next few years as planned, then the highway 
between Amman and Aqaba, (330 km) will become heavily congested by trucks, 
particularly those carrying containers. Accordingly around 1000 trucks need to be 
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cleared daily and with each truck of 12 meters in length requiring at least a 100 meter 
safe driving distance on the road, then a simple calculation shows that about 110 km 
of the highway will be occupied by trucks carrying containers daily. The scenario 
will become worse if trucks carrying other goods like grains, steel, cereals and other 
types of cargoes are added. However, for the port the picture will be even darker as 
congestion inside the terminal yards will become a daily reality considering that on 
average every 50 seconds, one TEU needs to be loaded on a truck and cleared to 
leave the yard. 
  
However, the Government has taken many steps to privatize the railway service in an 
effort to improve and expand the service. In 1998 a long term management and 
operation contract was concluded with an international consortium of two US 
railways (Wisconsin Central International Incorporation and Raytheon Infrastructure 
Incorporation) and a Japanese trading house (Mitsubishi Corporation), but the 
consortium withdrew from the deal following the collapse of a joint venture 
negotiations between the government and Norse Hydro Company for building a $600 
million exporting chemical plant in Aqaba (Wilber, 2001). Nevertheless, 
rehabilitation needs of the railway network in Jordan seem to be recognised but 
action does not seem to be among the priorities. 
 
 3.2.3  Air Transport Infrastructure 
 
Unlike the other modes of transport, the main competitive edge of air transport is in 
the international passenger transport and transportation of high value and perishable 
goods for which speed, reliability and service quality matter most. However, such 
service would not be possible without airports that provide sufficient infrastructure 
capacity and supply airlines with the required services. To this end, the air transport 
infrastructure in the ASEZ is reflected basically in its airport facility. 
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3.2.3.1   Airports 
 
Air transport is significant to cross border tourism, thus a very important sector to 
Jordan’s economy. In 2000 the tourism receipt amounted to $800 million, which was 
equivalent to a 23% share of the exports. There are three airports in Jordan and King 
Hussien International, which is the country’s regional airport, is located inside the 
ASEZ. Currently the airport is undergoing intensive modernisation and upgrading 
work to be prepared for the expected increase in air traffic following the 
government’s decision of free skies policy for airlines using this airport, in its effort 
to encourage tourism. 
 
The contribution of King Hussien International Airport in the logistics industry 
inside the zone is limited to passengers’ traffic with almost no airfreight activities. 
However, in the last three years there has been a noticed growth in the number of 
aircraft landing at this airport mainly for tourists coming from Europe. Table 3.4 
shows the aircraft and passenger traffic in King Hussien International airport for the 
period 2001-2003. 
 
Table 3.3 Traffic via King Hussien International Airport (2001-03) 
Year 
Aircraft Movement 
(In&out) 
Passengers (arrivals & 
departures) 
Airfreight (Ton) 
(in&out) 
2001 1912 58528 37 
2002 2442 48258 77 
2003 2735 90081 263 
Source: Ministry of Transport (Jordan) 
 
From the figures in this table, there seems to be a good logistics opportunity to be 
invested to increase the contribution of this sector in the value chain.  Most flights to 
the zone are tourist charters, which transport tourists to Aqaba. In all the cases 
airplanes return empty to Europe with plenty of unutilized space. 
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3.2.3.2   Sea/Air Transhipment 
 
The idea here is to integrate air cargo into the multimodal logistics chain through 
capitalizing on the location advantage of Aqaba Port to offer sea-air transhipment. 
For instance high value goods destined from Asia to Europe can be shipped by sea 
first to Aqaba Port and from here to final destination in Europe by air.  In fact, if this 
study can show that Aqaba Port has a potential to position itself as the Mashrek’s 
gateway port by capturing Asian cargo destined for Mashrek east Mediterranean 
ports, then the chances for the success of offering a sea-air transhipment service 
should be high, mainly because of the underutilized air traffic in the airport for cargo 
purposes. Another supporting factor is the fact that the distance between the 
container terminal and the airport in the zone is less than 10km. 
 
Similarly, not benefiting from chartered flights coming to Aqaba and using them to 
transport Jordan’s airfreight imports represents another unrealised logistics and 
multimodal opportunity. Currently, all airfreight imports come through Queen Alia 
International Airport in Amman on board regular passenger and special air cargo 
planes. Naturally, carrying freight in the belly-holds of tourist charters is less 
expensive than using regular and special cargo planes. Then, airfreight can be 
trucked from Aqaba to Amman with less total cost.    
 
In fact, this logistics solution has been implemented successfully by the port of 
Dubai and is now under study by the port of Aden (Muller-Jentsch, 2002). Similarly, 
Malysian seaport Tanjung Pelepas has also succeeded in implementing the same 
concept, whereby the port in conjuction with MASkargo arm of Malaysia Airlines 
System Bhd, offer shippers and forwarders cheaper (up to 40 per cent) and faster 
delivery to North America, Europe, Australia and East Asia. (UNCTAD, 2003). 
 
Certainly this represents a tremendous opportunity for the airport to grow and create 
value added services and become more functional in ASEZ logistics network. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.   AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF LOGISTICS POTENTIAL  
 
4.1   Open Transport Market 
 
With all the international political and economic determination and support, it has 
become evident that, sooner or later, political and artificial barriers to trade will be 
reduced in the Mashrek region. Therefore, an enlarged integrated transport market 
will emerge, which will increase the competition between logistics platforms and 
intermodal nodes in the region, and therefore an early review of present efficiency 
levels of logistics infrastructure would be necessary to maintain competitiveness. 
Hesse (2004) points out that due to increased competition between logistics 
platforms, all ports and freight hubs are currently committed to expanding their 
infrastructure. Similarly, the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, 
stresses that efficiency of transport logistics has increasingly become an important 
determinant of the success of any trade liberalization and regional integration 
process. Micco (2003) reports that reduction in artificial trade barriers has 
emphasized the importance of transport costs as a remaining barrier to trade.  
 
Previously, this study showed that Mashrek economies are incurring high transport 
costs due to inefficient management of transport logistics and underutilization of 
regional logistics networks. Since ASEZ is part of the multimodal transport network in 
Mashrek, it is the main interest of this research to analyse from an economic point of 
view where and how ASEZ can contribute to the efficient utilization of this network 
and therefore reducing the high transport costs incurred by region’s international trade.   
Similarly, UNCTAD (2003) reports that in light of changes in global production 
system and transport services structure and advancement of information technology, 
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traditional transport services are no longer sufficient. Instead a more comprehensive 
and efficient utilization of multimodal transport logistics services are required. 
 
Therefore, the author believes that the total transport logistics cost concept can be the 
best instrument to develop an economic and cost comparison for using ASEZ’s 
logistics platforms with other platforms in the region. Also, following the system 
approach will assist in analysing the value chain for moving goods from the source to 
different markets in the Mashrek through the available entry points in the region.  
   
4.2   Total Logistics Cost Concept 
 
Logistics is understood as the efficient management and optimization process for 
“getting the right goods needed for consumption or production to the right place at 
the right time in the right condition at the right cost” (Ellram, L.M.; Lambert, D.; and 
Stock, J.R. 1998, p.11). Through optimization of these integrated logistics activities, 
the concept of minimizing the total cost developed as a strategic management tool, 
which can considerably increase domestic and global trade competitiveness. Limao 
and Venables (2000) show that trade volume can be reduced by more than 20% when 
transport costs (one element of logistics costs) increase by 10%. Total cost concept is 
one of the main four logistics concepts (total system, customer service and trade-offs 
concepts) which aims at minimizing the overall costs related to both the motion and 
holding of goods all through the supply chain. In technical terms, these costs include 
transportation costs, inventory carrying costs, order processing costs, material 
handling costs on a total basis.  
 
However, this research looks at the total transport logistics cost from the perspectives 
of both the total transport costs and the time costs of holding the goods in transit. 
Since the use of the other logistics components along the transport chain varies from 
one country in the region to another and from one shipper to another even within the 
same country. For instance, while some shippers use their own warehousing facilities 
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there are others who outsource this activity. In contrast, all shippers outsource the 
maritime transport of their goods and the port services to these goods.    
 
Similarly, this research analyses the total transport logistics costs for door-to-door 
transport from a selected source to different markets in Mashrek countries. In this 
context, Amman (Jordan), Damascus (Syria), Beirut (Lebanon), Jerusalem (West 
Bank and Gaza) and Tel Aviv (Israel) are identified as the major economic centers in 
the region where the majority of population, commercial and industrial activities are 
concentrated. Since shippers are assumed to select the least cost route for delivering 
their goods from sources to their respective markets in the region, then the objective 
is to examine whether Aqaba Port (ASEZ’s maritime entry point) can be the port that 
minimizes the total transport logistics cost.  
 
Likewise, this research chooses to focus on containerised transport for several 
reasons. Logistics services are better suited with containerised transport, which was 
one of the major driving forces behind its revolution. Progressively, international 
trade is witnessing an explosive growth in containerization worldwide, which reflects 
the increasingly growing demand on multimodal transport and therefore logistics 
services. According to Drewry Shipping Consultants, international container traffic 
increased from 79 to 225 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) between 1989 
and 2000. Similarly, UNCTAD (2003, p.3) recognises that growth of containerized 
transport “has considerably affected modern transport patterns and practices”.  
 
Accordingly, two approaches will be used in this study to estimate the direct 
economic feasibility of ASEZ’s logistics platforms. First, the author will develop a 
general transport econometric model for the least cost transport route through which 
a set of relevant variable will be identified and several functional relationships will 
be derived. Secondly, the author will use more explicit practical data from primary 
sources on the different elements of the costs involved in the door-to-door transport 
process and perform a set of computational transactions.  
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However, it must be pointed out that there are several other factors beside the total 
cost concept, which shippers and carriers take into consideration when choosing the 
transport routes for shipments. Similarly, major developments have taken place in the 
transport industry and influenced the structure of such decision. These changes are 
explained further in the next section.  
 
4.2.1   Transport Routes 
 
Increasingly, shippers demand door-to-door service, which makes the final point of 
delivery determine the total distance and therefore the total transport cost. This 
growing change in shippers’ behaviour has shifted the port selection and route for 
shipment from shippers to carriers. Furthermore, the deregulation of the maritime 
industry in the early 1980s in different parts of the world (1984 Shipping Act in the 
US and 1986 Shipping Regulations in Europe) has accelerated the development of 
port selection logistics and multimodal transport. According to Malchow (2001), 
prior to these organisational changes maritime carriers could not establish contracts 
for inland transport. He also reports that as a result of introducing the door-to-door 
rates, shippers, who were concerned more about the overall service than shipments 
specific route, began allowing the carriers to select routes. Consequently, the 
carriers’ interest is no longer focused on direct measures of cost and time; instead it 
becomes more involved in the indirect system that focuses on economies of scale and 
just-in-time transport. Progressively, the carriers began to expand their services to 
control more activities in the transport chain. (ESCAP, 2003).  
 
Again, although this research uses the total cost concept but carriers have other 
factors such as; the size of the local market, the quality and quantity of the 
multimodal network, the efficiency of the logistics chain and the port efficiency and 
productivity. Although, the total transport cost is important but these factors also 
influence the carriers’ decision. 
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Since each of the Mashrek countries uses its own port/s as the main entry point/s for 
its cross-border trade, then it can be said that with the opening of the transport 
market in the region more than one transport route could be established for any 
particular trade. Looking at the distribution of the ports in the region, Aqaba Port is 
the only major port located on the Red Sea considering that Israel’s Eilat Port is a 
small port with limited capabilities for containerised transport.  
 
 
 
 Figure 4.1 Portion of Middle East Map  
 Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/middleeast_ref01.pdf 
 
Since demand on transport is derived from international trade, apparently, the Indian 
Ocean and East Asia represent the best markets potential for Aqaba Port. On the 
other hand Europe and the north and south Americas represent the best markets 
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potential for the other Mashrek east Mediterranean ports. Malchow (2001, p.94) 
reports that it is not wise for ports to concentrate marketing on shipments beyond 
their market potential. To illustrate he suggests that “US ports in the Pacific 
Northwest should not focus marketing on shipments for Europe or South America”.  
 
Accordingly, trade between the region and Asian economies or in other shipping 
terms the “east of Suez” trade is where ASEZ should theoretically have its potential 
advantage and therefore, this research focuses on this trade to explore how such 
advantage can be achieved and optimized.  
 
To this end the theoretical framework of this part is based on the fundamental 
microeconomic theory and assumes that shippers tend to minimize the total cost of 
moving containers from sources to markets.  
 
4.2.1.1   First– Transport Model Approach 
 
In principle, many routes can be used to transport a container from a source in Asia 
to a market in a Mashrek country or vice versa. Shippers select the route that 
minimizes the total cost in the transport process from the origin to the destination. 
Therefore, by identifying the least-cost transport route, the port the containerized 
cargo will go through, is also determined.  
 
The concept here is based on set of assumptions and variables, which comprise the 
components of the total transport logistics cost for a door-to-door transport process 
as previously defined. This method allows the visibility to understand the relative 
importance of the key identified variables and how changes in these variables affect 
the total cost and the choice of port and route.  
 
To illustrate, we assume the followings: 
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Fhei  FEU container of cargo i to be imported from port h to e destination, 
h  refers to Hong Kong port as the selected hub port  in Asia, 
e  refers to the destination (eÎ[1, 4]) in the Mashrek region (economic centers), 
a ship cost in dollars per F per mile (US$/FEU/mile) excluding canal dues, 
n  refers to container port in Mashrek region (Aqaba, Beirut, Lattakia & Haifa),  
Dhn  Ocean distance in nautical mile between port h to the nth container port  
Rn  port charges in dollars per F container at the nth port (ship agents fees included), 
ßne  Inland transportation cost per container in dollars per km by each mode from 
the nth port to the destination e. The total inland cost is the sum of costs spent 
for each transportation mode j (jÎ[truck, rail]). However, in our case there is 
no rail there is a transfer from one mode of inland transport (truck) to a 
similar mode as the case will show that during its inland voyage between nth 
port to e destination, the container F is transferred from one truck to another 
on borders between certain countries in the Mashrek region,  
Ox  cross-border charges and expenses per container F at the xth cross-border, 
Dne inland transportation distance in km, 
Ss  sea transportation speed is miles per hour,  
Sj  Inland transportation speed is km per hour,  
Hn  port dwelling time at nth port in days, 
Hx waiting time on xth cross-border in days between nth port destination e, 
Hz time for transiting the Suez canal in days between h and nth ports, 
Hb time in days at the hub port between h and nth ports, 
F  Terminal handling charges in dollars per F in hub port (US$/FEU) all moves, 
? Suez Canal dues in dollars per F (US$/FEU), (applies to east Med. Ports) 
Vi  the value of the cargo i in a container, 
?  prevailing perfect capital market rate of interest on capital invested in cargo,  
 
In the following parts the transport and time costs are defined and mathematical 
formulas are derived accordingly to demonstrate how these costs can be determined. 
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4.2.1.1.1  Transport Costs: is defined as the sum of all expenses paid along the 
transport logistics chain for transporting the goods (inside the container) from 
origin to the final destination including those paid to intermodal nodes and cross-
borders. Therefore, in this case, it includes the ocean freight, port expenses 
including terminal handling charges, overland transport (trucking in our case) 
costs and cross-border charges and expenses.     
 
For one container F to be transported from Hong Kong Port, as the selected hub 
port, to one economic center e in the Mashrek region via nth port, the transport 
cost (C1) consists of two parts; the sea and overland costs. Sea transport costs 
include: a) container’s share of the ship costs excluding Suez canal dues, 2)  
container’s share of the Suez canal dues, 3) terminal handling charges at the hub 
port and 4) port charges per this container. The overland costs include the sum of 
trucking costs per container and the charges paid during the overland transport trip 
per container such as cross border expenses and charges in some cases of this 
modal. Therefore: 
 
Transport cost  =  Ocean  +  Port  charges + Hub port +  Suez canal + Cross-border  + Sum of  
through nth port      freight     & expenses           THC dues        expenses         overland costs 
 
 
  C1(n) =  (a * Dan)+  Rn  + Ox + F + ? + S ßnej *  Dnej          ……..….   (1) 
 
 
4.2.1.1.2  Time Cost: represents the opportunity cost of time for the capital invested 
in the cargo (inventory). The total time spent during the transport process includes 
the time spent in sea seaming and the time for transiting the canal, the inland 
travel time, days in both the entry and the hub ports and the waiting time at cross-
border/s in some cases. 
 
Total number = days at sea + Suez canal + entry port + hub port + cross-border/s + inland transport  
of days     steaming transit        (in days)    (in days)       (in days)            leg (in days) 
 
Htotal  =   (Dhn/24Ss) + Hz + Hn + Hb + Hx  + S (Dnej/24 Sj)    ................ (2) 
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The cost of time (C2)  =     terminal value of Vi during the in transit  
for Vi through nth port         period at interest rate ? 
 
 
 C2(n)  =  Vi* [(1+ ?)Htotal – 1]          …………………………………..…...….. (3) 
 
 
4.2.1.1.3  Total Transport Logistics Cost (TLC) in the transport process of cargo i 
using the   nth port is represented by the cost of transport and the cost of time, 
therefore, TLCi(n) is the sum of costs from the above (1) and (3): 
 
 
TLCi(n) =  C1(n) + C2(n)  =  a*Dan+ Rn + Ox+S ßnej*Dnej + Vi* [(1+ ?)Htotal –1] ….. (4)      
 
 
Since the underlying theoretical framework is based on assumption that shippers 
seek to minimize the total transport logistics cost, this module makes it possible to 
determine the least-cost route for delivering goods from sources to markets among 
the available choices in the transportation network within the Mashrek region.   
 
Therefore, shipper selects the the nth port that minimizes the total transport logistics 
cost TLCi(n) for the containerized good i by: 
 
 
min [TLC i(n) ]   .................................................................................................................. (5)  
 
 
The above equations show clearly how changes in different factors such as location, 
vessel speed, costs of different modes of transport, value of goods, or interruption of 
services at ports and roads will all affect the total cost of transportation via the port 
and therefore, affect the demand for container transport services through that port.  
 
 45 
 
 
 
These formulas are applied on the available routes from Hong Kong to all identified 
economic centers in the region and resulted in several conclusions: 
 
a) For shipping to Amman, Aqaba Port is the least total cost route; 
b) For shipping to Beirut city, Beirut Port is the least total cost route under the 
present inefficient logistics conditions along the transport chain from Aqaba to 
Beirut. The simulation shows that in case dwell time in Aqaba and the waiting 
time at cross-borders are reduced to one day each, then total cost via Aqaba can be 
less and more competitive for high value goods and under high interest rates 
market; 
c) For shipping to Damascus and at the current logistics conditions, Beirut Port is the 
least total cost route only for goods with value less than $125,000 and at an 
interest rate of 5 percent; for goods with value higher than this amount then total 
cost via Aqaba Port is less even at the above interest rate. However, under 
improved logistics conditions Aqaba route to Damascus becomes the least total 
transport logistics cost; 
d) For shipping to Tel Aviv and under the current logistics conditions, Haifa Port is 
the least total cost route only for goods of value less than $65,000 and at an 
interest rate of 5 percent; for goods with higher value than this amount, then total 
cost via Aqaba Port is less even at above rate. Same thing can be said here about 
Aqaba route becoming the least total cost under improved logistics conditions.  
 
Certainly, from manipulating with the different variables in this simulation model, it 
can be seen that ASEZ’s potential to compete with other intermodal nodes in the 
region for trade with the Indian Ocean and East Asia can be enhanced if the present 
logistics inefficiencies are improved. For illustration see tables in Appendix C.  
 
However, it should be pointed out that the data used in this model is according to 
actual market rates except for the ports charges and the Suez Canal dues, which are 
assumed equally for all options. In reality, port and terminal handling charges (THC) 
are important and can significantly affect the competitiveness of any port. 
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4.2.1.2   Second – Actual Market Rates Approach 
 
This approach uses the current actual market rates, which are collected from primary 
sources, to compare the total transport cost for delivering containerized goods from 
the source to economic centers in Mashrek countries via each country’s own entry 
port/s with the costs of delivering the same container to the same locations but via 
Aqaba Port. This process involves three stages; namely ocean transport stage, port 
interface stage and the over-land transport stage. 
 
Nevertheless, it must be noticed that the current market’s rates used in this approach 
include different elements in their structure like market situation, competition, 
structure of the service, port efficiency. However, the objective is to build an 
economic analysis on present actual market rates in order to determine which 
transport route that can minimize the total cost. 
 
4.2.1.2.1   Multimodal Transport Network 
 
An imported 40-foot container from Hong Kong Port to a domestic distribution 
facility inside any of the defined economic centers in Mashrek involves both an 
overland and sea transport. In between these two stages the shipment goes through 
several activities, such as unloading from vessel, terminal handling, customs 
clearance and national border crossing procedures in some cases. To illustrate the 
logistics of this process and the effects of land and sea distance separately, the 
journey of the container is broken into overland and ocean components.  
 
4.2.1.2.2   Ocean transport costs 
 
Acknowledging that the import process starts when the importer opens a Letter of 
Credit (L/C) in favour of the exporter and that the total logistics cost concept traces 
the path of goods along the supply chain, particularly from production to 
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consumption, this research is only concerned with that part of the path, which 
involves the region’s logistics infrastructure facilities in order to compare efficiency 
and competitiveness. Therefore, the starting point of tracing the supply chain for 
imports will be from the time the goods are loaded onboard the vessel in a selected 
hub port in Asia and sailing on its voyage to the port of discharge in the region.  
 
On the contrary, the starting point of tracing the supply chain for region’s exports is 
from the stage when the L/C is opened by the buyer and accepted by the exporter in a 
Mashrek country. While Hong Kong Port is selected as the starting point of the 
supply chain for imports from different Asian economies to the economic and 
consumption centers in the region, it is to be considered also the end point for 
exports from the same economic and production centers in the region to the different 
Asian economies. In any case, this research focuses only on the transport logistics of 
imports to the Mashrek countries. 
 
Table 4.1 FEEDER freight rates from Hong Kong to Mashrek ports / (June/04) 
From  To  
Container 
Size/Type 
Base 
Ocean 
Freight 
War Risk 
Surcharge 
(Asia-
Europe) 
(OHC) 
Hong 
Kong 
BAF 
(Asia to 
Europe) 
CAF 
(FEA to 
Europe) 
Doc. Fee 
(Hong 
Kong) 
 
TOTAL 
Hong Kong Aqaba 20' Dry 2150 0 264.94 90 0 14.75 2519.69
    40' Dry 4200 0 352.83 180 0 14.75 4747.58
  Haifa 20' Dry 2000 9 264.73 106 0 14.74 2394.47
    40' Dry 4000 18 352.55 212 0 14.74 4597.29
  Beirut 20' Dry 2000 24 264.73 90 108 14.74 2501.47
    40' Dry 3900 48 352.55 180 210.6 14.74 4705.89
Source: Global Sales Director of Maersk-Sealand Line and company’s website (www.maersk-sealnad.com) 
 
Since Aqaba Port is connected with Asia particularly China through various Asian 
ports by both direct and feeder connections, the research examines each type of 
connection separately to demonstrate the effect of type of service on ocean freight 
and transit time. Maersk-Sealand Line, which connects most Mashrek ports with 
Asia by feeder connection, has provided a very detailed breakdown for their freight 
charges. These quotes were obtained directly from the Global Sales Department of 
the Maersk-Sealand shipping line company and from the company’s website. 
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Table 4.1 shows that the basic freight rate for shipping a 40-foot container from 
Hong Kong to Aqaba is 5% higher than the rate to Haifa although Aqaba is closer to 
Hong Kong. These findings, which will be explained in details in the next chapter, 
are attributed to the feeder service structure to the region.   
 
Surprisingly, other shipping lines that connect Aqaba directly with Hong Kong, such 
as EVERGREEN, APL and COSCO have quoted lower freight rates. They charge 
US$3,000 for shipping a 40-foot container from Hong Kong to Aqaba on liner out 
bases (port terminal handling charges are included). With this rate Aqaba port is 14% 
less than Haifa and Beirut ports, which quoted a freight rate of US$3,600 on the 
same bases. It should be pointed out that the quoted rates in table 4.2 are basic rates 
and in reality shippers negotiate with the shipping lines or freight forwarders.  
 
Table 4.2 Freight rates for 40-foot container with DIRECT service  
From  To  
Liner out Ocean 
Freight US$/40' 
Hong Kong Aqaba         (Jordan) 3,000 
  Lattakia      (Syria) 3,600 
  Beirut         (Lebanon) 3,600 
  Haifa           (Israel) 3,600 
 Source: COSCO Line, APL Line & ESCWA . 
 
Obviously, these results confirms with the geographic location differences of those 
ports. While the feeder connection to Aqaba abolished its geographic location 
advantage, the direct service connection on the other hand proved that Aqaba Port 
could capture a competitive position with respect to maritime transport with Asia. 
Therefore, the type of connection between ports proved to be a very important factor, 
which may offset the potential cost advantage from a shorter distance.  
 
As a result, this research is going to use the direct connection rates from as the bases 
for comparison and the total transport cost calculations. However, maritime transport 
forms one part of the transport cost and therefore the effect of this factor cannot be 
generalized until all the other transport cost components are taken into consideration.   
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4.2.1.2.3   Intermodal transfer process (Handling costs) 
 
This process covers the stage from the time the container is unloaded from the vessel 
on the quayside until it is loaded on a truck to be transported to the importer’s 
warehouse or distribution point. During this stage, many activities take place such as 
transferring the container to the storage area, submitting of manifests to ports and 
customs by the ship agent and the submitting of official declaration and invoices to 
customs and arranging for a truck to transport the container by the clearing agent, 
who is appointed by the cargo owner. When all relevant port and customs charges are 
paid and paper work formalities are cleared, customs officials examine the 
information on the cargo manifest with contents of the containers according to 
certain procedures and once approved, the truck is allowed to enter the storage area 
inside the port and at this point the goods are officially released to the clearing agent 
on behalf of the cargo owner. Normally, these procedures are almost the same in all 
ports of the region except maybe in Syria (Containerization, April 1999) where the 
state owns and controls everything including the shipping agency activities.  
 
This stage, which ends when the overland transport activity of the container begins, 
involves costs and time as it may take days and even weeks in some ports. On the 
contrary, the international best practice benchmark for this stage is measured by 
hours. According to ESCWA (2003) the average total time a container spends inside 
Aqaba Port before it is cleared by customs can reach up to 3 days, while it takes 5 
days in Lattakia and in Beirut port 2 days. However, according to other sources in 
Haifa port it takes 2 days for transit cargo.  
 
4.2.1.2.4   Overland transport costs 
 
However, cost efficiency of sea freight to the port is no longer the only determinant 
of a port’s competitiveness and the best route shippers or carriers will choose. In fact, 
inland transport cost is becoming noticed as an important cost factor to be 
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considered. Hummels (1999) noticed that inland transport costs make up a large 
share of the total international shipping expenses. In the same study he concludes 
that inland transport costs can reach between 40 to 60 percent of the total door to 
door transport cost. Similarly Malchow (2001) emphasizes the significance of both 
the inland and oceanic distances between a shipment’s origin and a shipment’s 
destination as the most influential geographic factors represented by cost and time. 
 
Accordingly, with the fact that most economic centers in Mashrek are inland located 
except Beirut, the overland distance is equally important component in determining 
the transport cost. Venables (2001, p.5) concludes that “an extra 1000 km in land 
distance adds $1,380” per standard 40 foot container. An increase in overland 
distance will increase the cost of using the relevant infrastructure. Therefore, 
efficiency and effectiveness of hinterland connections between Mashrek ports and 
inland markets becomes a very vital factor linked with the location impact.  
 
As explained earlier this stage starts from the time the container is loaded on the 
truck and exits the port’s gate on its way to the final destination of the shipment. 
Data used under this section were obtained from the UN-ESCWA and other primary 
sources.  Accordingly, this stage involves two levels of costing analysis: 
 
a) the trucking cost of the container from Aqaba to economic centers in the region,  
b) the trucking cost of similar containers to the same economic centers but via their 
own domestic ports. Although some cases include border crossing, the time cost 
element will be considered later. 
 
For containers transported from the domestic port to the economic center in the same 
country, normally the process goes very smoothly and takes few hours only 
depending on the topography of the area. A truck journey from Aqaba to Amman 
takes less than 5 hours to travel a distance of 335 km. On the other hand, it takes 8 
hours for a truck to travel the 350 km from Lattakia to Damascus in Syria.  
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Table 4.3 Road transport costs for 40-foot container to economic centers in Mashrek  
From (port) To (city) 
Road Distance 
(km) 
Transport 
cost (US$) 
Cost US$ 
per km 
Trip’s time 
(days)* 
Aqaba      (Jordan) Amman      (Jordan) 335 550 1.64 0.21
Beirut      (Lebanon) Beirut         (Lebanon)    5 50 **10 0.05
Lattakia    (Syria) Damascus   (Syria) 350 600 1.72 0.21
Haifa       (Israel) Tel Aviv     (Israel) 120  700 5.83 0.08
Gaza***    (WB/Gaza) Jerusalem   (WB/Gaza) n/a n/a n/a n/a
Source: ESCWA & other sourcess.             * Waiting time in port or at cross-borders not included,    
**The port is within the same city zone      *** Gaza port has no containers facilities 
 
Table 4.3 shows the cost of road haulage between economic centers in the Mashrek 
region and the domestic port in the same country.  It also shows variant costs per km, 
which is attributed to the difference in the region’s economies and in the structure of 
the road transport market and conditions of demand and supply in each country.    
 
On the other hand, for the second part of this analysis the situation becomes a little 
complicated where transporting the container from Aqaba to the same locations in 
Mashrek countries includes border crossings. Usually this process consumes time 
and involves cross-border checkpoints formalities and inspection of vehicle and 
cargo by customs officials of the two bordering countries each separately. In some 
cases the truck transporting the same shipment goes through more than one cross-
border point as the case from Aqaba to Beirut in Lebanon.  Trucks enter a transit 
country in a convoy accompanied by customs officials or police in most cases. 
Therefore, trucks are asked to wait at the cross-border point until there is enough 
number of trucks for the convoy and in most cases the waiting time extends due to 
fixed working hours at the border. A specialized study for the Jordan Government 
regarding transport problems and bottlenecks showed that, at one of the highly 
frequent cross-border points “during peak hours truck queues can reach 6 km, with 
some 500 to 600 trucks in waiting position” (GOPA, 1996, p.75). The study reports 
that transporters often have to calculate at least 6-8 hours waiting time before 
entering the first checkpoint. Although most border points in Mashrek region operate 
with similar procedures, this process is important in the transport chain therefore its 
efficiency can determine the competitiveness of the cross-border logistics chain.  
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Table 4.4 shows the average waiting time that a truck transporting a 40-foot 
container spends at the cross-borders between Jordan and other Mashrek countries. 
The ESCWA study reports that a truck transporting a container from Beirut to 
Amman in Jordan will spend at least 5 days as waiting time on the two cross-border 
checkpoints (Lebanon-Syria and Syria-Jordan 2.5 days each). 
 
Table 4.4 Waiting time/costs at cross-border/s from Aqaba to Mashrek countries 
From To 
No. of Cross-
Borders 
Border charges 
& costs (US$) 
Average Waiting 
Time (days)* 
Aqaba      (Jordan) Amman      (Jordan) - - - 
  Beirut         (Lebanon)    2 450 5 
  Damascus   (Syria) 1 350 2.5 
  Tel Aviv     (Israel) 1 * 0.5-1 
  Jerusalem   (WB/Gaza) 2 * 0.5-1 
Source: ESCWA & other sources.       * Included in the road transport cost. 
 
At the Israeli side of the Jordan-Israel cross border, the Israeli officials have a limit 
of 15 trucks which they process daily; other trucks would have to wait for their turn 
the next day (Muller-Jentsch, 2002). Therefore, the average waiting time was given 
as a range between 12 to 24 hours depending on the load of work on that day. 
 
While the cross border expenses and time used are important, the transport costs 
from Aqaba to final destinations in Mashrek countries are equally important. Table 
4.5 shows the costs for transporting a 40-foot container from Aqaba Port to economic 
centers of Mashrek countries. It also shows the time needed for the truck to make 
such trips.  The cost to distance (km) ratio seems within a reasonable margin for all 
destinations except for Israel and the West Bank due to certain requirements.  
 
Table 4.5 Road transport costs for 40-foot container from Aqaba Port 
From (port) To (city) 
Road Distance 
(km) 
Transport 
cost (US$) 
Cost US$ 
per km 
Trip’s time 
(days)* 
Aqaba   / Jordan Amman  / Jordan 335 350 1.04 0.2
  Beirut     / Lebanon   640 650 1.02 0.4
  Damascus   / Syria 550 550 1.00 0.3
  Tel Aviv    / Israel 490 950 1.94 0.3
  Jerusalem  / WB/Gaza 470 950 1.94 0.3
Source: ESCWA & other sources (Survey with local freight forwarders and shipping agents) 
 * Waiting time in port or at cross-borders not included,    
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So far, the figures in tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 can be summarized to give us the total 
transport cost for the available options. Accordingly, Table 4.6 summarizes these 
figures and compares the transport cost of shipping a 40-foot container from Hong 
Kong to the economic centers in Mashrek countries through their domestic ports on 
the Mediterranean with shipping via Aqaba port on the Red Sea. 
 
Table 4.6 Total Transport Cost for 40-foot container from Hong Kong Port 
 Transport COST via 
Mediterranean 
Transport COST via Red Sea 
(Aqaba Port) 
Shipment's Route  
Sea  Land  
Total  
Sea  Land  
Cross-
Border 
costs 
Total  
Saving                 
Red Sea         
vs. 
Mediterranean 
US$ %   
Hong Kong - Beirut (city) 3,600 50 3,650 3,000 650 450 4,100 -450 -11% 
Hong Kong - Damascus 3,600 600 4,200 3,000 550 350 3,900 300 8% 
Hong Kong -  Tel Aviv 3,600 700 4,300 3,000 950 * 3,950 350 8% 
Source: Compiled by the Author.                        * Border costs are included in land transport cost. 
 
Clearly, except for Beirut, and even with the current low efficient logistics 
conditions, saving of 8-9 percent in transport cost can be achieved when shipping to 
Damascus and Tel Aviv via Aqaba Port. Obviously, the high charges on the two 
cross-borders between Aqaba and Beirut and the fact that Beirut city is a port city 
made the transport cost via the Red Sea option uncompetitive for shipping to Beirut. 
 
 
4.2.1.2.5   Time Cost 
 
As explained earlier this cost, which is an important component of inventory carrying 
cost, represents the opportunity cost of time for capital invested in cargo (inventory). 
 
In this analysis, the 40-foot container represents a capital tied up in the goods inside 
that container. Likewise, these goods are in fact inventory in transit and as time 
passes, the cost of capital invested in these goods grows (Ma, 2003). As investors 
seek to minimize the capital turn over time, management of time becomes very vital 
logistics activity for investor’s profitability and supports the minimization of the total 
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cost. This can only be achieved by designing the most appropriate logistics system, 
which takes into consideration the inventory related costs as an integrated part of the 
total cost concept.  
 
Accordingly the author reviews the total elapsed time in transporting the 40-foot 
container on the two routes in order to demonstrate the significance of time in this 
process. Table 4.7 shows the total time used in the transport process of the 40-foot 
container from Hong Kong up to its final destination in the different economic 
centers in Mashrek countries via their national ports on the Mediterranean. Clearly, 
Aqaba Port has an advantage when direct shipping connection with Hong Kong is 
used. It takes a shipment 17 days to reach Aqaba Port compared with 19.5 days to 
Beirut, Lattakia and Haifa. Otherwise Aqaba Port is on the same level with those east 
Mediterranean ports when feeder service is used.  
 
On the other hand, with the feeder connection more time is used for all routes, which 
makes this service uncompetitive with the direct connection. Therefore from now on 
the research will use the direct service rates and figures. 
 
Table 4.7 Total time elapsed for transporting 40-foot container from Hong Kong Port 
to economic centers via DOMESTIC ports  
Ocean  
(Day) Port Road 
TOTAL TIME 
(Day)  Shipment's Route 
Feeder Direct (Day) (Day) 
Cross-
borders 
(Day) Feeder Direct 
Hong Kong - Aqaba - Amman 21 17 3 0.2 0 24.2 20.2
Hong Kong - Beirut (port) - Beirut (city) 22 19.5 3 0.05 0 25.05 22.55
Hong Kong - Lattakia - Damascus 30 19.5 5 0.2 0 35.2 24.7
Hong Kong - Haifa - Tel Aviv 22 19.5 2 0.1 0 25.1 21.6
Source: ESCWA & other sources (Survey with local freight forwarders and shipping agents) 
 
 
Likewise, Table 4.8 focuses on shipping via Aqaba Port on the Red Sea and shows 
the total time needed to transport the 40-foot container from Hong Kong up to its 
final destination in the different economic centers in Mashrek countries on this route 
under the current logistics conditions.  
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Table 4.8 Total time elapsed for transporting 40-foot container via AQABA  
Ocean Transport 
(Day) Port Road 
TOTAL TIME 
(Day)  Shipment's Route 
Feeder Direct (Day) (Day) 
At Cross-
borders 
(Day) Feeder Direct 
Hong Kong - Aqaba - Amman 21 17 3 0.2 0 24.2 20.2
Hong Kong - Aqaba - Beirut  21 17 3 0.4 5 29.4 25.4
Hong Kong - Aqaba - Damascus 21 17 3 0.3 2.5 26.8 22.8
Hong Kong - Aqaba - Tel Aviv 21 17 3 0.3 0.5 24.8 20.8
Source: ESCWA & other sources (Survey with local freight forwarders and shipping agents) 
 
Clearly, the feeder option reduces Aqaba Port’s time saving advantage and therefore 
the focus must be on the direct connection. 
 
Table 4.9 summarizes the two tables (4.7 and 4.8) and compares the total time of the 
shipment using direct connection via Aqaba Port and via east Mediterranean ports.  
Clearly, except for Beirut, shipping via the Red Sea route saves time only in the case 
of direct connection. It takes 21.6 days to transport this container from Hong Kong to 
Tel Aviv via Haifa (the country’s own port) while only 20.8 days via Aqaba Port. 
Similarly, it takes 24.7 days to transport same container to Damascus via the 
country’s national port of Lattakia compared to 22.8 days via Aqaba Port.  On the 
contrary it takes less time to ship to Beirut via the domestic port of Beirut than to 
ship via Aqaba Port (22.55 days via Beirut Port while 25.4 days via Aqaba Port). As 
can be seen the differences in favour of Aqaba Port are not wide and vary from few 
hours in the case of Haifa and less than two days in the case of Lattakia.  
 
Table 4.9 Total Time elapsed for transporting 40-foot container from Hong Kong Port  
 Shipping TIME via 
Mediterranean 
Shipping TIME via Red Sea                  
(Aqaba Port) 
Shipment's Route  
Sea  Port Road 
Total  
Sea  Port Road 
Cross-
Border 
costs 
Total  
Saving TIME                 
Red Sea             
vs.    
Mediterranean  
  DAYS % 
Hong Kong - Beirut (city) 19.5 3.0 0.05 22.55 17 3 0.40 5.00 25.40 -2.85 -11% 
Hong Kong - Damascus 19.5 5.0 0.20 24.70 17 3 0.30 2.50 22.80 1.90 7% 
Hong Kong -  Tel Aviv 19.5 2.0 0.10 21.60 17 3 0.30 0.50 20.80 0.80 4% 
Source: Compiled by the Author.         
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Although the final conclusion has not been reached yet, it could be explained that 
with respect to the saving in time, the Aqaba-Beirut (Red Sea) route does not 
compete with the Beirut’s (Meditteranean) route due to the fact that Beirut is a port 
city and there is no overland transport needed when shipping via its port, while via 
Aqaba Port there is time lost during the overland transport and obviously at the two 
cross-border points. Although there is no border crossing for the other two economic 
centers when shipping via their own ports, overland transport is needed. 
 
However, Table 4.10 concludes the results of both Table 4.6 and Table 4.9 and 
compares the total transport cost and the total transit time for shipping a 40-foot 
container from Hong Kong to economic centers in Mashrek between shipping via 
their own ports on the Mediterranean and via Aqaba Port on Red Sea. Although the 
present logistics conditions in Aqaba Port and along its transport chain to local and 
regional markets are not efficient still savings in both time and transport cost can be 
achieved when shipping to Damascus and Tel Aviv. 
 
Table 4.10 Comparison of transport cost & transit time (Mediterranean vs. Red Sea)  
Hong Kong-Beirut 
Hong Kong-
Damascus 
Hong Kong-  
Tel Aviv Route Options 
Cost US$ 
Time 
(Days) Cost US$ 
Time 
(Days) Cost US$ 
Time 
(Day) 
MEDITERRANEAN 3650 23 4200 25 4300 22
RED SEA 4100 26 3900 23 3950 21
Saving Red Sea vs. Mediterranean  -450 -3 300 2 350 1
% of Red Sea saving vs. Mediterranean -11% -12% 7% 8% 8% 5%
Source: Author’s calculations         *N.B: Number of days are rounded off therefore, slight differences  
may be noticed with figures in previous tables. 
 
So far, it has become clear what time savings can be achieved and via which route, 
but the actual financial value of this saving must be determined and integrated with 
the other actual transport costs in order to accomplish the total transport logistics cost 
concept.  Ma, (2003) reports that the cost of capital invested in transit inventory is 
the rate of return that will be foregone on that amount of money. Similarly, Hummels 
(2001) defines the per day cost of goods as a function of the per day interest rate on 
the goods in transit and the depreciation rate for the goods.  
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Therefore, the selected route depends on both the total transport cost and the capital 
cost. However, determining the capital cost depends on the value of the goods inside 
the transported container and the market interest rate. As most Mashrek countries 
import manufactured goods from Asian economies, then the value of a typical 
imported container (filled with such goods) could be $500,000 to $600,000. 
 
Since the purpose of this research is not the determination of exact total cost but to 
give objective information and general conclusion on the saving in time and total 
transport cost, three values are assumed for goods in the 40-foot container 
(US$100,000, 250,000 and 500,000). While different values of interest rates (7.5, 
12.5 and 17.5%) are also assumed to estimate the capital cost, the depreciation rate is 
not recognised in this analysis since it involves defining specific goods and therefore, 
different depreciation rates, which is not the purpose of this study as mentioned 
before. However, this rate can be very significant especially for perishable goods. 
 
Table 4.11 Daily capital costs for the different proposed inventory investment values 
7.5% 12.5% 17.5% Interest rates 
 US$ 
Daily Capital cost for inventory investment of US$ 100,000 21 34 48 
Daily Capital cost for inventory investment of US$ 250,000 51 86 120 
Daily Capital cost for inventory investment of US$ 500,000 103 171 240 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Accordingly Table 4.11 calculates the daily capital costs for the different proposed 
inventory investment values on the basis of the suggested three different interest 
rates. Based on these figures, a spreadsheet simulation model is used to incorporate 
these values in order to calculate the total transport logistics costs for this case. 
 
4.2.1.2.6 Total Savings  
 
Aside from Beirut, Table 4.12 clearly shows that depending on the value of the 
shipped goods, a saving of as high as US$780 per containers can be achieved when 
shipping to Damascus and Tel Aviv via Aqaba Port. 
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Therefore, for Syria, Israel and 
the West Bank the advantage of 
using the Red Sea route rather 
than the Mediterranean route for 
Asian trade is evident. Although 
these savings accounts for less 
than 0.5 percent of the goods 
value, they account for 8-18% 
of the total transport cost when 
shipping via the domestic ports. 
Therefore, shippers can choose 
whether to pay or save this 8-
18% transport logistics cost. 
 
Interestingly, how would the situation be if the prevailing logistics conditions on the 
Aqaba transport chain, to local and regional hinterland markets, are improved. For 
instance, if the dwell time in Aqaba Port is reduced to 1 day instead of 3 days and the 
waiting time at the Jordanian-
Syrian and at the Syrian-
Lebanese cross-borders is 
reduced to 1 day each and to 6 
hours on the Jordanian-Israeli 
cross-border, how would these 
improvements affect the total 
cost via Aqaba.  Accordingly, 
Table 4.13 calculates the 
savings that can be achieved 
when the logistics conditions 
along the transport chain are 
improved to better levels. While the savings to Damascus and Tel Aviv are 
increased, shipping to Beirut via Aqaba produces saving for the high value goods.    
 
Table 4.12 Total saving via Aqaba on Red Sea 
vs. east Mediterranean ports/Present Condition 
Capital  
invested in 
inventory 
Daily 
Capital 
Cost Beirut Damascus Tel Aviv 
US$ 
100,000 21 -513 342 371 
100,000 34 -552 368 384 
100,000 48 -594 396 398 
250,000 51 -603 402 401 
250,000 86 -708 472 436 
250,000 120 -810 540 470 
500,000 103 -759 506 453 
500,000 171 -963 642 521 
500,000 240 -1170 780 590 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Table 4.13 Total saving via Aqaba vs. east 
Mediterranean ports / Improved Condition 
Capital  
invested in 
inventory 
Daily 
Capital 
Cost Beirut Damascus Tel Aviv 
US$ 
100,000 21 -387 384 434 
100,000 34 -348 436 486 
100,000 48 -306 492 542 
250,000 51 -297 504 554 
250,000 86 -192 644 694 
250,000 120 -90 780 830 
500,000 103 -141 712 762 
500,000 171 63 984 1034 
500,000 240 270 1260 1310 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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CHAPTER 5  
5.   THE LOCATION ADVANTAGE & MULTIMODAL SOLUTIONS 
 
 
The previous econometric analysis revealed that ASEZ has a potential logistics 
advantage attributed to its geographic location.  However, this advantage is not 
absolute but limited to certain maritime trade routes. While the location advantage of 
the Red Sea Aqaba Port is for trade with Asian markets (east of Suez trade) it can be 
said that the advantage of the other east Meditarranean ports is for trade with Europe 
and Americas markets. How has ASEZ’s location created this competitive 
advantage? What are the current logistics shortages along ASEZ’s transport chain, 
which can limit this advantage? What transport and logistics opportunities can be 
utilized from this strategic location? These are the questions that this section covers.  
 
5.1  ASEZ’s Location Advantage 
 
As explained, this advantage, which gives Aqaba Port a relatively competitive edge 
for the growing trade with Asia, is reflected in savings in freight and shipping time to 
ASEZ compared to other Mashrek ports on the Mediterranean. This advantage, 
which is gaining importance due to current changes in world trading patterns, 
originates from two major sources; namely maritime distance and shipping time. 
 
5.1.1   Maritime Distance 
 
Bond E. (2001) in his study identifies geography, particularly distance, and transport 
infrastructure quality as the most important factors that affect the level of transport 
costs and ultimately the overall logistics costs. Similarly, Venables (2001) realises 
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that transport cost reflects the distance cost and this appears clearly when he 
categorizes the costs of distance into four kinds: the direct shipping costs (cost of 
moving goods internationally), searching costs (cost of finding potential trading 
partner), management and control costs and the cost of time used in shipping goods.  
 
Located on the Gulf of Aqaba at the northern part of the Red Sea puts ASEZ at a 
relatively closer distance to Asian markets than other major nodes in the Mashrek 
region. Trade between Asia and the region or what is called “east-of-Suez” trade, can 
be channelled via Aqaba Port whereby vessels do not need to travel more distance 
and pass the Suez canal to call the east Mediterranean ports. Many researchers have 
found a direct relationship between distance and transport cost whereby more 
distance reflects in higher transport cost. Micco (2003) finds that doubling the 
distance increases maritime transport costs by around 20 per cent.  
 
Table 5.1 Maritime distances between Hong Kong and Mashrek ports 
ROUTE 
Maritime 
Distance  
Maritime Distance 
between Aqaba & 
Hong Kong  Difference  
  Nautical Miles % 
Hong Kong Port - Beirut (Lebanon) 6607 6223 384 6.2% 
Hong Kong Port - Latakia (Syria) 6688 6223 465 7.5% 
Hong Kong Port - Tartous (Syria) 6656 6223 433 7.0% 
Hong Kong Port - Ashdod (Israel) 6502 6223 279 4.5% 
Hong Kong Port - Haifa (Israel) 6548 6223 325 5.2% 
Hong Kong Port - Gaza (WB&Gaza) 6490 6223 267 4.3% 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Encyclopedia - Veson Nautical Distance calculation engine & 
author’s calculations and verification. 
 
Table 5.1 shows the maritime distances in nautical miles between Hong Kong Port, 
as a major hub center in Asia and ports in the Mashrek region. Aqaba is 267-465 
nautical miles (494-861 km) closer to Hong Kong than the other ports in the region. 
Although the differences are very small and could be considered marginal in the 
maritime industry, Venables (2001, p.5) calculates that “an extra 1000 km by sea 
distance adds $190” per standard 40-foot container. Proportionally applying 
Venable’s conclusion the maritime transport cost of a 40-foot container to Aqaba 
should be US$94-164 less than the Mediterranean ports of the region. On the other 
hand, it should be mentioned that the above table does not show the actual maritime 
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distance between Aqaba Port and the east Mediterranean ports; it shows the 
additional nautical miles that a vessel coming from “east of Suez” needs to travel to 
reach these ports. Accordingly, Table 5.2 shows the actual maritime distance 
between Aqaba Port on the Red Sea and other ports on the east Mediterranean. 
 
Table 5.2 Maritime distances between Aqaba Port and Mashrek ports 
East Mediterranean Ports in The Mashrek Region  Maritime Distance  Nautical Miles 
Aqaba Port (Jordan)               -                   Beirut Port (Lebanon) 563 
Aqaba Port (Jordan)               -                   Latakia Port (Syria) 644 
Aqaba Port (Jordan)               -                   Tartous Port (Syria) 612 
Aqaba Port (Jordan)               -                   Gaza (WB&Gaza) 420 
Aqaba Port (Jordan)               -                   Ashdod Port (Israel) 458 
Aqaba Port (Jordan)               -                   Haifa Port (Israel) 504 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Encyclopedia - Veson Nautical Distance calculation engine 
 
Therefore, from a theoretical point of view Aqaba should enjoy less maritime 
transport cost for trade with Asia than east Mediterranean ports. Accordingly, the 
same argument theoretically applies on the potential geographic advantage of the east 
Mediterranean ports when discussing trade with Europe and the US (west of Suez). 
 
However, the previous analysis showed that the distance and transport cost theory 
does not hold with the feeder connection to Aqaba whereby the actual freight rates 
from Hong Kong to east Mediterranean ports were lower than to Aqaba.  Different 
opinions were sought to explain this contradiction. According to H. R. Hansen, 
Director of Global Sales, Maersk-Sealand Line, the difference in “mother vessels/ 
feeder vessels connect and layover days at intermediate hub ports” could be the 
reason behind such variance (personal communication, April 19, 2004). On the other 
hand, Celestino and Inmaculada (2002, p.4) argue that “most distance-related costs 
tend to decrease with the continuous development of new technologies”. However, 
they also report that higher levels of transport infrastructure tend to slightly decrease 
the effect of distance related costs. Similarly, Ward and Huang (1999) show that the 
cost of moving information about “transported goods” has declined steadily in the 
second half of the last century (92% between 1969-1998), which reduces the distance 
 62 
 
 
 
effect. Hummels (2001) acknowledges that distances remained the same while the 
cost of moving goods by sea has declined.  
 
While, the effect of technology is general and reduces the distance related costs on 
maritime transport in general and not on certain routes, the author believes that 
Maersk-Sealand’s explanation is relevant since it refers to an important element in 
this equation that is the cost and distance of the feeder connection. Further 
investigations revealed that the above rates were quoted by the line which feeders to 
Aqaba and to east Mediterranean ports through Damietta in Egypt. This means Asian 
cargo is shipped first to Damietta on the Mediterranean, north of the Suez Canal and 
then back around the Sinai Peninsula to Aqaba, which increase the distance to levels 
that offset Aqaba’s advantage over the east Mediterranean ports from the difference 
in the oceanic distance to Hong Kong. Another point to be considered is the fact that 
vessels calling Aqaba needs to deviate from an international maritime route and sail a 
distance of 180 km (97 nautical miles) from Teiran Straits up to the port on the 
Jordanian coast. Same distance will be travelled before the vessel returns back to a 
position where it can proceed on international maritime routes.  
 
However, in the case of direct connection the distance effect is realized and reflected 
in less transport prices, which corresponds with the savings from the shorter distance 
travelled. In short, the impact of geography on logistics cost is reflected in freight 
rate mark-up. However, since the difference in distance between Aqaba and east 
Mediterranean ports is relatively small there must be another factor that justifies the 
proportionally higher difference in freight from Hong Kong to these ports.  
 
5.1.2  Shipping Time  
 
Hummel (2001, p.23) concludes that lengthy shipping times increase transport 
logistics cost, particularly through imposing inventory holding and depreciation costs 
on shippers. He shows that “each day saved in shipping time is worth 0.8 percent ad-
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valorem for manufactured goods”, which means that a 25 day ocean voyage imposes 
costs equal to a 20 percent tariff on the shipped goods. 
 
However, shipping time and maritime distance are closely related. A basic 
navigational and physics rule states that time and speed are inversely proportional. 
But earlier the author showed that difference in maritime distances between the 
ASEZ and east Mediterranean ports is relatively small; therefore, its impact on the 
shipping time is also low. Actually, shipping time between Aqaba and east 
Mediterranean ports is higher than the usual time needed to travel the short distance 
between these ports.  In fact, the need to pass the Suez Canal in order to call the east 
Mediterranean ports has a major impact on both the shipping time and transport cost.  
 
Vessels travelling between Asia and Europe choose to go through the Red Sea and 
transit the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean or vice versa since this route saves time 
and cost in comparison to if vessels had proceeded via Cape of Good Hope route. 
Yet vessels planning to pass through the canal must comply with the rules and 
regulations of the Suez Canal Authority and pay some significant dues. While 
transiting the canal in a convoy, vessels steam at low speed due to navigational and 
safety reasons. Therefore, shipping time increases in accordance with above rule. 
Usually the transit time takes 24 hours although actual steaming is only 16 hours 
(Elassy, 2000). Similarly, there are certain scheduled times for transiting the canal 
and vessels arriving after the set time limits must wait until the next convoy. While 
there is one convoy from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, which starts at seven 
o’clock every morning there are two convoys from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea 
every day. Still, vessels are always at risk of not catching the scheduled convoys and 
have to wait for the next convoy the next day.  
 
Therefore, from a transport cost view a vessel coming from east, which chooses to 
call at Aqaba Port rather than an east Mediterranean port will save the sea voyage 
cost for the extra distance and the Suez Canal dues. Similarly, from a time cost view 
a vessel also saves the extra distance steaming time and the time used in transiting 
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the canal in addition to the risk of not catching the convoy and losing extra time and 
cost. Table 5.3 calculates the shipping time for a direct sea voyage of a container 
vessel from Hong Kong Port to ports of the region at a speed of 24 knots and shows a 
comparison with shipping time to Aqaba Port. For the east Mediterranean ports one 
day is added for transiting the Suez Canal. Clearly, there is a saving of two days 18 
percent of the total sea voyage time. 
 
Table 5.3 Shipping time between Hong Kong and Mashrek ports 
Shipping Time  
Shipping Time 
for Hong Kong-
Aqaba  Difference  ROUTE 
Days % 
Hong Kong - Beirut (Lebanon) 13 11 2 18.2% 
Hong Kong - Latakia (Syria) 13 11 2 18.2% 
Hong Kong - Tartous (Syria) 13 11 2 18.2% 
Hong Kong - Ashdod (Israel) 13 11 2 18.2% 
Hong Kong - Haifa (Israel) 13 11 2 18.2% 
Hong Kong - Gaza (WB&Gaza) 13 11 2 18.2% 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Encyclopedia - Veson Nautical Distance calculation engine & 
author’s calculations and verification. 
 
5.2  International Trade Patterns 
 
Evidently the new changes in world trade patterns may have a positive effect on 
traffic growth to Aqaba. Drewry shipping consultants (2004) report that since joining 
the WTO in late 2001, China is increasingly taking on the role as the "factory of the 
world". Therefore, foreign direct investments are soaring into China and boosting its  
economic development and growth rates. This development is leading to a complete 
shift in world trading patterns. Certainly, the foreign trade of Mashrek countries as 
part of this global pattern is witnessing a shift along this trend. Therefore, from a 
global trade pattern point of view, the ASEZ also enjoys a favourable position with 
regard to the rising external trade of Mashrek countries with Asian economies. The 
increasingly shifting of world production to China gives ASEZ the greatest locational 
advantage and enhances its chances to market itself as a potential gateway and a 
distribution destination to the region for trade with the fast growing Asian 
economies, China in particular.  
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While this analyses highlights certain advantages for the ASEZ, it also reveals 
several shortages in the transport logistics system of the country and the region. 
 
5.3   Logistics shortages 
 
The analysis of the actual market logistics costs in the previous chapter, which 
reflects the current logistics conditions in Jordan and the region, revealed several 
deficiencies and constraints in the multimodal transport and logistics network. The 
long dwell time in Aqaba Port, lack of proper rail transport network and lengthy 
cross-border formalities and procedures are significant hindrances, which undermine 
and limit ASEZ’s potential as a gateway. The aim here is to pinpoint those 
constraints, disclosed in the previous analysis, which affect the total logistics cost. 
 
5.3.1  Cross-Border Trade Flow 
 
WTO (1998) reports that the “time lost waiting for border release in many regions 
accounts for up to 25 per cent of total transport costs” (ESCAP, 2003, p.44). In fact 
this case confirms to some extent WTO’s remark. While the whole transport voyage 
from Hong Kong to Beirut via Aqaba takes 25 days, the waiting time at cross-borders 
takes 5 days accounting for 20 percent of the total transport time. Certainly, this 
unnecessary lost time, which is high by international standards adds up to the total 
transport cost and minimizes efficient utilization of multimodal transport network.  
 
However, it is believed that once the political barriers are removed and the Euro-
Mediterranean free trade agreement becomes effective all these restrictions will be 
streamlined and harmonized and therefore time at the cross-borders between Jordan 
and its neighbours will be reduced to the normal international standards. As a result 
the region’s cross-border logistics efficiency will improve considerably and enable 
the region’s economies, importers and exporters in the region to benefit from this 
improvement and savings in time and cost. This case shows a live example on the 
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missing opportunities, which countries in the region could capture had the quality of 
the region’s logistics infrastructure network been more efficient.  
 
5.3.2   Road Haulage 
 
The same analysis showed that trucking costs between Jordan and Israel is much 
higher than to those in other countries. While the same truck which loaded the 
container in Aqaba Port transports it to its final destination in Syria and Lebanon, it 
is not the case with Israel, where the container needs to be transferred from the 
Jordanian truck to the Israeli truck at the cross-border bridge before being trucked to 
its final destination in Tel Aviv once formalities are approved. The transport cost for 
the Jordanian truck is according to the haulage market structure in Jordan, which has 
very low rates compared to transport rates in Israel. For example, the cost of trucking 
a 40-foot container from the bridge (cross-border checkpoint) to the Port of Haifa 
(distance of less than 200 km) is nearly US$1000 while for a longer distance in 
Jordan (Aqaba to Amman) the cost is much less (US$350 for 330 km). 
  
5.3.4   Dwell time in port 
 
Similarly, the minimum 3 days dwell time before the container is released from 
Aqaba Port (ESCWA, 2003) is too high and reflects poor port infrastructure quality. 
Likewise, this unnecessary lost time limits Aqaba Port logistics potential and 
increases the inventory carrying cost which adds up to the total transport cost. 
Several researches have concluded that port efficiency is an important factor in 
transport cost. Venables (2001) shows that low infrastructure quality accounts for 
more than 40% of the predicted transport costs. Additionally, he reports that poor 
quality infrastructure increases the waiting time for goods to clear ports or other 
intermodal nodes, which results in higher capital costs. In the same way, Micco 
(2003) concludes that maritime transport costs can be reduced to more than 12% by 
improving port efficiency from the 25th to the 75th percentiles. However, it is 
expected that container port efficiency will improve considerably after AP Moller 
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Terminals were given a 25 years concession contract to manage and operate the 
terminal (Thomas, 9 March 2004)  
 
5.4   Multimodal Transport Solutions 
 
No doubt that opening up of transport market and smoothing cross-border transport 
flows in Mashrek region can initiate and revive different transport logistics solutions 
and opportunities. Among these solutions is an intermodal land bridge to link 
between ports on the Mediterranean with Aqaba Port on the Red Sea. 
 
5.4.1   Red Sea - Mediterranean Land-bridge 
 
This concept was utilized in the region during the closure of the Suez Canal during 
1967-75. Cargo shipped from Europe to Lebanese and Syrian ports on the east 
Mediterranean then trucked to Gulf countries. Similarly, “Negev Continental Bridge” 
(NCB) between Eilat on the Red Sea and Haifa on the Mediterranean was used to 
facilitate containers and cars transport between Europe and the Mediterranean at one 
end and the Indian Ocean and East Asia at the other end (Elassy, 2000). However, 
this activity was suspended once the Suez Canal reopened in 1975.  
 
Therefore, the idea here is to 
create an intermodal solution 
besides the Suez Canal, where 
container vessels coming from 
the east call at Aqaba Port to 
unload the European and 
Mediterranean cargo and have it 
transported by rail and road to 
one of the ports in the region on 
the east Mediterranean where it 
will be reloaded on another  
Figure 5.1 Red Sea – Mediterranean land bridge 
Source:http://www.judaicaheaven.com/stores/judaicaheav
en/catalog/JP332.jpg 
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vessel to transport the cargo to the different ports in Europe and vice versa.  The 
economic viability of such initiative originates from the established fact that savings 
in time and freight can be achieved by shipping from Asia to Aqaba instead of 
transiting the canal to east Mediterranean ports. However, could this viability hold 
for shipments to further destinations in Europe and the Mediterranean that is what 
this part of the research will try to cover?  
 
Naturally, shipping between east and west over the Red Sea – Mediterranean “Red–
Med” land bridge is viable if savings in cost and time can be achieved to carriers and 
shippers up to the last destination. In this research the author examines the total time 
for shipping from Shanghai Port in China as a major growing hub port in Asia to two 
different destinations: directly to Rotterdam Port in the Netherlands as a major center 
in northern Europe and via a hub port to Istanbul Port as a growing port in the Black 
Sea/east Mediterranean region.   
 
Accordingly, viability of this approach can only be examined by applying the total 
transport logistics cost concept on all available options and compare them with the 
“Red-Med” land bridge option. Therefore: 
1) The direct “Shanghai-Rotterdam” maritime connection will be examined against 
the “Shanghai-Aqaba-land-bridge-east Med. port-Rotterdam”, and  
2) The feeder maritime connection “Shanghai-Port Said-Istanbul” will be examined 
against the “Shanghai-Aqaba-land-bridge-east Med. port-Istabul”,  
 
In the Mashrek region, there are several east Mediterranean ports with land distance 
between them and Aqaba ranging from 200 km to about 650 km. Therefore, the 
following two conditions are assumed for the land bridge option:  
 
Efficient Condition: representing the shortest path with potentially highly efficient 
logistics conditions as the best situation. Actually, this path is the Aqaba – Gaza 
path (about 200 km) but presently no port infrastructure exists in Gaza, neither 
an overland connection to Aqaba. For the research purposes it is assumed that a 
highly efficient container port exists in Gaza and a highly efficient railway 
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connection between Aqaba and Gaza also exists. Therefore, under such 
conditions the containers are transported by railway and trucks to the port in 
Gaza on the same day the vessel was unloaded in Aqaba. For instance, the total 
time needed to unload a 7500 TEU vessel in Aqaba and transport the boxes over 
the 200 km land-bridge and reload in Gaza Port, on another container vessel, 
take about 2 days. (using 4 gantry cranes each capable of 70 moves per hour). 
 
Low efficiency Condition: representing the longest path with low logistics 
efficiency as the extreme situation. Actually the longest path is the Aqaba – 
Lattakia path and in this case there is no need for assumptions since currently 
this path has low efficient logistics conditions according to the ESCWA study 
(2003). A container is cleared after 3 days from the time vessel commenced 
unloading in Aqaba Port then it is trucked to Lattakia (650 km) where in 
between at the cross border it waits another 2.5 days. After arriving at Lattakia 
Port, it stays for another 2 days before reloading on another vessel. Therefore, 
the total time used in this path is 8 days including the time on the road. 
 
While direct maritime connection involves only the time of sea voyage including the 
Suez canal transiting time, the feeder via the hub port connection on the other hand 
involves the time of the two sea voyages (Shanghai–Port Said) and (Port Said –
Istanbul) in addition to the time used for handling of containers at the hub port.  
 
Naturally, it is assumed that the container vessel used for the three options is the 
same with the same conditions and specifications, speed, carrying capacity and all 
other operational cost elements per unit per mile except the canal dues, which do not 
apply to the Aqaba option. Furthermore, it is also assumed that this vessel sails from 
Shanghai Port in China directly to the specified ports according to each option 
without any interruption or stoppage at intermediate ports except as mentioned for 
the options. Vessel speed for all options is assumed 24 knots and therefore shipping 
time of each voyage is calculated according to maritime distance travelled on each 
route, but for those routes, which include transiting the Suez canal one day is added.  
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Table 5.4 Shipping time between Shanghai and Rotterdam via various routes 
Sea 
Voyage 
Suez 
Canal 
Hub 
Port/s 
Land-
Bridge
Cross-
Border
TOTAL 
TIME SHIPMENT'S ROUTE 
Maritime 
Distance 
(n. miles) Days 
Direct Connection  (Shng.-Rtdm) 10392 19 1 0 0 0 20.00
"Red-Med" Land Bridge (Shng.-Aqb.=Gz- Rtdm) 10328* 18.7 0 1.8 0.20 0 20.70
"Red-Med" Land Bridge  (Shng.-Aqb=Ltk- Rtdm) 10325* 18.7 0 5 0.50 2.50 26.70
Source: compiled by author from Fairplay World Shipping Encyclopedia - Veson Nautical Distance 
calculation engine) and other sources.        *: overland distance not included. 
 
Accordingly, the total time used for transporting a container from Shanghai Port to 
Rotterdam Port using the above three options is illustrated in the Table 5.4. Clearly, 
it shows a saving of less than a day in favor of the direct maritime connection 
Shanghai-Rotterdam over the “Red-Med” land bridge via Gaza, which means that the 
saving in time from Shanghai to Aqaba was offset by the time spent in unloading and 
reloading of containers in Aqaba and Gaza respectively. However, this result also 
indicates that the determinant factor is the transport cost since the time cost showed 
no significant saving in time could be achieved. Unless the container transport cost 
over the Red Sea- Mediterranean land bridge is considerably less than the transport 
cost through the Suez Canal, then the land bridge cannot compete with the canal on 
direct maritime connections. On the other hand, the “Red-Med” land bridge via 
Lattakia is clearly very inefficient on this route even if the lost time in port and at 
border is eliminated and logistics infrastructure is improved.  
 
Table 5.5 compares total transport time for shipping a container from Shanghai Port 
to Istanbul Port via Port Said as the hub port with the land bridge options. 
 
Table 5.5 Shipping time between Shanghai and Istanbul via various routes 
Sea 
Voyage 
Suez 
Canal 
Hub 
Port/s 
Land-
Bridge 
Cross-
Border
Total 
Time SHIPMENT'S ROUTE 
Maritime 
Distance 
(n. mile) Days 
Feeder Connection via hub (Shng.-PSD-Istl.) 7904 14.4 1 2 0 0 17.40
"Red-Med" Land Bridge (Shng.-Aqb.=Gz-Istl) 7802* 14.3 0 2 0.10 0 16.40
"Red-Med" Land Bridge  (Shng.-Aqb=Ltk-Istl) 7752* 14.1 0 5 0.50 2.50 22.10
Source: compiled by the author from Fairplay World Shipping Encyclopedia - Veson Nautical 
Distance calculation engine) and other sources.       *: overland distance not included. 
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It can be seen there is a 6 percent saving in time for the land bridge via Gaza 
compared to shipping to Mediterranean ports via a hub port. Although this saving is 
relatively low, it emphasizes the need to study the transport cost via the land bridge 
to find out the true viability of the Red Sea-Mediterranean land-bridge route.  
 
However, the increasingly expansion of hub ports in the region indicates that these 
ports are becoming a significant part of the transport chain. To a certain extent the 
“Red-Med” land bridge concept is similar to the hub port concept with one exception 
that in the first case two ports (Red Sea and Mediterranean) are playing jointly the 
role of the one hub port in the second case.  
 
Clearly, under the present international shipping conditions the “Red-Med” land 
bridge option cannot be considered for the direct maritime connections. However, 
this option can become very significant in case the size of container vessels grows to 
levels beyond the Suez Canal capabilities. Then various “Red-Med” land bridges will 
emerge as a strategic solution for more efficient maritime trade on the east-west 
route.  Alassi (2000) has proposed another similar bridge between Egyptian ports 
Sukhna on the Red Sea and Dammiata or Port Said on the Mediterranean. As 
container vessels are becoming increasingly larger and more expensive, time is an 
important factor in the success of operating such vessels. Therefore, any saving in 
time is an opportunity to improve the vessels’ operational utilization and maximizing 
earnings. Besides providing a solution to any Suez Canal limitations, “Red-Med” 
bridge offers shipping lines a better opportunity to serve the same markets but with 
shorter distances and transit time. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6.   CONCLUSION 
 
 
This research reveals the effectiveness of total transport logistics cost in identifying 
the true picture about ports’ potential markets. While many experts predicted low 
chances for Aqaba Port in competing with other ports in the region, this research 
concludes the opposite and showed through the total cost concept that Aqaba Port 
has the potential to be the region’s gateway for trade with the Indian Ocean and East 
Asian markets. Evidently the research illustrates that even under the current low 
efficient logistics conditions, total transport logistics cost for transporting a standard 
container from Asia to Syria and Israel, even to Lebanon under certain conditions, 
via Aqaba is less than via these countries’ own ports. However, the research points 
out that total cost is not the only factor, which carriers take into consideration when 
they select the shipment’s route. In many cases, there are other factors equally 
important which the research lists.  
 
Also the research reveals a few transport infrastructure under-investments and other 
logistics shortages, which can undermine ASEZ’s logistics potentials. The long dwell 
time for cargo in the port and the long waiting time on cross borders minimize the 
port’s competitive advantage in distant markets. Likewise the lack of a railway 
service between Aqaba Port and its markets for imported cargo, containers in 
particular demonstrates a serious shortage and significant missing link in the Zone’s 
multimodal transport network, which is required to make an important contribution 
to the economy. Certainly a combination of rail and road is necessary for Aqaba Port 
to build its capacity as a gateway to hinterland markets in the Mashrek region.  
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However, the research demonstrates that improving the transport infrastructure and 
logistics conditions in Aqaba Port and along the port’s transport chain to hinterland 
markets, can considerably enhances the port’s potential as a gateway to the region. 
Table 6.1 compares the percentage of the saving that can be achieved by using the 
Red Sea versus the Mediterranean route under the present logistics conditions with 
the potential saving under assumed improved conditions. This table, which reflects 
the saving in time only, shows significance jump in savings for the three destinations. 
 
Table 6.1 Comparison of savings in percentage (%)-Red Sea vs. Mediterranean route 
Condition Beirut Damascus Tel Aviv 
Under PRESENT conditions -13% 8% 5% 
Under IMPROVED conditions 13% 16% 18% 
Difference 26% 8% 13% 
Source: Concluded from other tables in this research 
 
Similarly, the research reveals the importance of the maritime route, service 
connection type and maritime distance in influencing both freight and total transport 
cost. While it is true that distance increases transport cost, in maritime transport the 
circumstances of the travelled route have an effect on the total cost as well. For 
instance the transport cost and shipping time for a vessel travelling a distance with 
passing the Suez Canal are not the same when travelling the same distance but 
without any canals along the path. Accordingly, shipping directly from “east of 
Suez” markets without the need to transit the canal gives Aqaba the distance and 
time advantages over the east Mediterranean ports. 
 
Furthermore, this research confirms and demonstrates how the following factors can 
influence the total transport logistics cost: 
 
1. Port’s geographical location with respect to sources and markets, which 
emphasizes the importance of the conditions along the maritime route between 
these points. Naturally, the location of Aqaba Port before the Suez Canal on the 
Red Sea resulted in less freight and shorter shipping time from Asia in 
comparison with the east Mediterranean ports.  
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2. The availability of sufficient multimodal transport network: without the highway 
network connecting the ASEZ with hinterland markets in the region, Aqaba Port 
would not be considered as a gateway to those markets. Although few ports in 
Mashrek enjoy both a railway and road connections with their captive local 
markets, non-existence of a regional railway network prevents the region from the 
railway cost advantages and ultimately capturing the less total cost benefit. 
 
3. The quality of transport infrastructure and efficiency of logistics chain. The 
research demonstrates how the total cost concept provides understanding of the 
relative importance of its components and how total cost is altered whenever any 
of these components changes. Evidently the simulation model illustrates how 
transport cost to Beirut via Aqaba Port can only be feasible if certain factors along 
the transport chain between Aqaba and Beirut are improved and become efficient. 
 
Progressively, the research discusses certain multimodal transport solutions for 
Jordan and the region. It presents a land bridge between Aqaba Port on the Red Sea 
and an east Mediterranean port as a multimodal transport solution for containerised 
transport between the Indian Ocean and east Asia markets at one end and Europe and 
Mediterranean markets at other end. Although no significant savings are concluded, 
the viability of this bridge would enhance considerably in case the size of container 
vessels grows to levels beyond the Suez Canal capabilities. On the other hand, the 
air/sea and air/road intermodal solutions represent another opportunity for Jordan to 
utilize the empty space on tourists’ charters, which call Aqaba increasingly.  
 
On the other hand, the research points out that the ongoing economic and political 
developments in the world are expected to bring stability to the Mashrek region and 
ultimately political and technical barriers will be removed and the transport market 
will open. As a result, shifting of activities between ports is evident, as changes in 
the regional patterns of transport and trade are expected. Although some ports might 
reject this fact, in reality this shifting provides theses ports with a better chance to 
meet the normal projected growth in traffic with less infrastructure investments. 
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Nevertheless, the research concludes that the localisation of logistics and distribution 
activities in the ASEZ is supported by many factors, out of which: a) the huge 
concentration of transport and cargo handling activities created by the traditional 
activities of the Aqaba Port, b) the developed network of roads and highways that 
provide an efficient hinterland connections between ASEZ and both domestic and 
transit markets, and c) the geographic location of ASEZ at the intersection of two 
continents and four countries.  
 
Evidently, the research shows that the ASEZ has the potential to become a gateway 
to the region but certainly some work needs to be done. Firstly, the Government of 
Jordan needs to take the necessary actions as soon as possible to improve the 
efficiency of the transport logistics system in Aqaba Port and to eliminate the 
shortages along the port’s transport chain particularly those pinpointed by this 
research. While many of these bottlenecks can be fixed through policy reforms with 
almost no real investment cost, the efficiency of most of the other port and related 
activities can be improved significantly through certain investment in the information 
and communication technologies and human resources building capacities with an 
average cost around $2 millions. Secondly, the Aqaba Port needs to join efforts with 
leading shipping lines to build on this research to develop a marketing plan to 
penetrate the potential hinterland markets in the region to become a gateway to the 
region. This research shows how many studies view such gateway ports as “engines 
of economic growth” for their region and the country. Consequently, the success of 
these efforts will enable the Jordanian economy to capture the economic benefits of 
becoming a gateway to the region and furthermore saving the $216-260 million, 
which the research shows that Jordan is incurring annually as freight cost above the 
international best practice benchmark.    
 
Finally, the author is confident that with the wise, determinant and visionary 
Hashemite leadership of Jordan and the dedication of its people, the future of the 
ASEZ is prosperous and promising not only on the national level but on the regional 
as well. 
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APPENDIX  A 
 
BERTHING FACILITIES AND DIMENTIONS AT AQABA PORT  
 
 
Table (A.1) Berthing facilities and dimensions at the MAIN Port 
BERTH No./Name 
WATER DEPTH 
(meter) 
LENGTH 
(meter) 
VESSEL 
DISPLACEMENT (Ton) 
No. 1 General Cargo Berth 11 160 45,000 
No. 2 General Cargo Berth 11 180 45,000 
No. 3 General Cargo Berth 13 180 53,000 
No. 4 General Cargo Berth 12 180 53,000 
No. 5 General Cargo Berth 11 180 53,000 
No. 6 General Cargo Berth 11 180 53,000 
No. 7 General Cargo Berth 8 150 8,000 
No. 8 General Cargo Berth 5.8 150 8,000 
No. 9 General Cargo Berth 5.4 150 8,000 
No. 10 Barges & Tugboat Berth 4 210 400 
PH-A Phosphate Berth A 11 210 25,000 
PH-B Phosphate Berth B 15 180 125,000 
Source: Aqaba Ports Corporation (Jordan) 
 
Table (A.2) Berthing facilities and dimensions at the CONTAINER Port 
BERTH No./Name 
WATER DEPTH 
(meter) 
LENGTH 
(meter) 
VESSEL 
DISPLACEMENT (Ton) 
Container Berth No. 1  15.1 180 84,000 
Container Berth No. 2 15.2 180 84,000 
Container Berth No. 3  20 180 84,000 
RO-RO Berth 12 40 35,000 
Passenger Floating Berth 15 150 15,000 
Mo'tah Floating Berth 15 150 53,000 
Bulk Cement Berth 11 120 50,000 
Source: Aqaba Ports Corporation (Jordan) 
 
Table (A.3) Berthing facilities and dimensions at the INDUSTRIAL Port 
BERTH No./Name 
WATER DEPTH 
(meter) 
LENGTH 
(meter) 
VESSEL 
DISPLACEMENT (Ton) 
Industrial Berth seaward 15 200 70,000 
Industrial Berth landward 11 190 40,000 
Oil Jetty 25 140 406,000 
Timber Berth 6.8 80.6 14,000 
Source: Aqaba Ports Corporation (Jordan) 
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TABLE OF HISTORICAL CARGO TRAFFIC OF AQABA PORT 
 
 
YEAR 
INBOUND  ('000 
TONS) 
OUT-BOUND 
('000 TONS) 
TOTAL 
('000TONS) 
GROWTH 
(annually) 
1952 6.6 0.1 6.7 --- 
1953 56.2 4.0 60.2 802% 
1954 80.1 12.3 92.5 54% 
1955 134.6 66.3 200.9 117% 
1956 76.8 67.3 144.1 -28% 
1957 47.6 99.2 146.8 2% 
1958 272.4 137.8 410.2 179% 
1959 453.7 136.6 590.3 44% 
1960 461.3 223.6 684.9 16% 
1961 420.3 311.4 731.7 7% 
1962 368.6 286.5 655.1 -10% 
1963 451.7 275.2 726.9 11% 
1964 340.3 493.1 833.5 15% 
1965 408.2 521.6 929.8 12% 
1966 590.3 657.2 1,247.5 34% 
1967 353.8 650.9 1,004.7 -19% 
1968 161.4 694.7 856.2 -15% 
1969 205.0 538.5 743.5 -13% 
1970 195.6 186.3 381.9 -49% 
1971 278.1 387.2 665.2 74% 
1972 518.6 704.9 1,223.6 84% 
1973 433.8 811.2 1,245.0 2% 
1974 367.4 1,116.2 1,483.6 19% 
1975 682.8 870.6 1,553.4 5% 
1976 1,368.7 1,631.8 3,000.5 93% 
1977 1,389.4 1,722.3 3,111.7 4% 
1978 1,550.8 2,108.3 3,659.1 18% 
1979 2,301.4 2,708.7 5,010.1 37% 
1980 3,024.1 3,574.5 6,598.6 32% 
1981 5,804.7 3,530.1 9,334.7 41% 
1982 7,837.2 3,835.5 11,672.7 25% 
1983 6,098.8 5,059.1 11,157.9 -4% 
1984 6,448.3 7,158.1 13,606.5 22% 
1985 6,370.1 8,177.6 14,547.7 7% 
1986 7,153.2 9,697.4 16,850.6 16% 
1987 8,743.7 11,271.6 20,015.4 19% 
* 1988 *  9,143.2 10,953.0 20,096.1 0% 
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1989 8,694.7 9,986.0 18,680.6 -7% 
1990 6,164.6 8,871.9 15,036.5 -20% 
1991 5,548.0 7,677.5 13,225.5 -12% 
1992 6,021.7 7,361.8 13,383.5 1% 
1993 5,252.7 6,381.2 11,633.9 -13% 
1994 3,923.9 6,648.4 10,572.3 -9% 
1995 5,076.0 6,679.0 11,755.0 11% 
1996 4,608.0 7,396.0 12,004.0 2% 
1997 4,778.0 7,535.0 12,313.0 3% 
1998 5,333.0 7,310.0 12,643.0 3% 
1999 5,374.0 7,480.0 12,854.0 2% 
2000 5,359.6 7,192.9 12,552.6 -2% 
2001 5,251.6 7,791.4 13,043.1 4% 
2002 5,286.2 8,872.7 14,158.9 9% 
2003 9,607.3 8,239.9 17,847.1 26% 
Source: Compiled by Author from various sources  
APPENDIX  C-1
Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to BEIRUT via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 50,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $116.78 $3,109.58
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 50,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $139.73 $3,671.93
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 50,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 3 5 50,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3742 19.7 $135.10 $3,877.10
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 250,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $583.90 $3,576.70
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 250,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $698.63 $4,230.83
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 250,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 3 5 250,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3742 19.7 $675.51 $4,417.51
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 500,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $1,167.81 $4,160.61
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 500,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $1,397.26 $4,929.46
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 500,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 3 5 500,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3742 19.7 $1,351.02 $5,093.02
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 750,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $1,751.71 $4,744.51
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 750,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $2,095.89 $5,628.09
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 750,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 3 5 750,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3742 19.7 $2,026.54 $5,768.54
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 1,000,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $2,335.61 $5,328.41
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 1,000,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $2,794.52 $6,326.72
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 1,000,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 3 5 1,000,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3742 19.7 $2,702.05 $6,444.05
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$3,109.58
$5,328.41
$3,576.70
$4,160.61
$4,744.51
Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to BEIRUT via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 500,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $2,335.61 $5,328.41
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 500,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $2,794.52 $6,326.72
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 500,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 500,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $1,880.13 $5,622.13
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 550,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $2,569.17 $5,561.97
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 550,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $3,073.97 $6,606.17
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 550,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 550,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $2,068.15 $5,810.15
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 600,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $2,802.73 $5,795.53
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 600,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $3,353.42 $6,885.62
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 600,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 600,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $2,256.16 $5,998.16
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 700,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $3,269.86 $6,262.66
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 700,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $3,912.33 $7,444.53
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 700,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 700,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $2,632.18 $6,374.18
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 800,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $3,736.98 $6,729.78
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 800,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $4,471.23 $8,003.43
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 800,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 800,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $3,008.21 $6,750.21
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 1,000,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $4,671.22 $7,664.02
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 1,000,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $5,589.04 $9,121.24
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 1,000,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 1,000,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $3,760.26 $7,502.26
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APPENDIX  C-3
Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to BEIRUT via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 500,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $3,503.42 $6,496.22
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 500,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $4,191.78 $7,723.98
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 500,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 500,000 0.15 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $2,820.20 $6,562.20
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 550,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $3,853.76 $6,846.56
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 550,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $4,610.96 $8,143.16
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 550,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 550,000 0.15 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $3,102.22 $6,844.22
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 600,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $4,204.10 $7,196.90
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 600,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $5,030.14 $8,562.34
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 600,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 600,000 0.15 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $3,384.24 $7,126.24
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 700,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $4,904.78 $7,897.58
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 700,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $5,868.49 $9,400.69
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 700,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 700,000 0.15 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $3,948.28 $7,690.28
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 800,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $5,605.47 $8,598.27
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 800,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $6,706.85 $10,239.05
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 800,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 800,000 0.15 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $4,512.32 $8,254.32
Beirut-Beirut 0.4 6607 100 5 0 10 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 1,000,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 2992.8 17.0 $7,006.83 $9,999.63
Lattakia-Beirut 0.4 6688 100 1.02 0 350 0 200 24 70 70 4 1 1,000,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3532.2 20.4 $8,383.56 $11,915.76
Haifa-Beirut 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 1,000,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Aqaba-Beirut 0.4 6223 100 1.02 0 640 0 500 24 70 70 1 1 1,000,000 0.15 0 11 0 0 0 3742 13.7 $5,640.40 $9,382.40
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APPENDIX  C-4
Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to DAMASCUS via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 50,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $132.88 $3,703.08
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 50,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $134.68 $3,481.48
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 50,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $117.61 $3,506.81
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 50,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 75,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $199.32 $3,769.52
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 75,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $202.02 $3,548.82
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 75,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $176.42 $3,565.62
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 75,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 100,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $265.75 $3,835.95
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 100,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $269.36 $3,616.16
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 100,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $235.22 $3,624.42
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 100,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 125,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $332.19 $3,902.39
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 125,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $336.70 $3,683.50
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 125,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $294.03 $3,683.23
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 125,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 150,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $398.63 $3,968.83
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 150,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $404.04 $3,750.84
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 150,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $352.84 $3,742.04
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 150,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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$3,481.48
$3,548.82
$3,616.16
$3,683.23
$3,742.04
APPENDIX  C-5
Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to DAMASCUS via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 50,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $199.32 $3,769.52
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 50,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $202.02 $3,548.82
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 50,000 0.08 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $176.42 $3,565.62
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 50,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 75,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $298.97 $3,869.17
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 75,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $303.03 $3,649.83
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 75,000 0.08 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $264.63 $3,653.83
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 75,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 100,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $398.63 $3,968.83
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 100,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $404.04 $3,750.84
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 100,000 0.08 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $352.84 $3,742.04
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 100,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 125,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $498.29 $4,068.49
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 125,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $505.04 $3,851.84
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 125,000 0.08 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $441.05 $3,830.25
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 125,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 150,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $597.95 $4,168.15
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 150,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $606.05 $3,952.85
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 150,000 0.08 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $529.26 $3,918.46
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 150,000 0.08 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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$3,918.46
$3,830.25
$3,548.82
$3,649.83
$3,742.04
APPENDIX  C-6
Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to DAMASCUS via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 50,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $265.75 $3,835.95
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 50,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $269.36 $3,616.16
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 50,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $235.22 $3,624.42
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 50,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 75,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $398.63 $3,968.83
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 75,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $404.04 $3,750.84
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 75,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $352.84 $3,742.04
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 75,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 100,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $531.51 $4,101.71
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 100,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $538.71 $3,885.51
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 100,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $470.45 $3,859.65
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 100,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 125,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $664.38 $4,234.58
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 125,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $673.39 $4,020.19
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 125,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $588.06 $3,977.26
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 125,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 150,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $797.26 $4,367.46
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 150,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $808.07 $4,154.87
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 150,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $705.67 $4,094.87
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 150,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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$4,094.87
$3,859.65
$3,977.26 
$3,616.16
$3,742.04
APPENDIX  C-7
Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to DAMASCUS via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 50,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $398.63 $3,968.83
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 50,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $404.04 $3,750.84
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 50,000 0.15 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $352.84 $3,742.04
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 50,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 75,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $597.95 $4,168.15
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 75,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $606.05 $3,952.85
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 75,000 0.15 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $529.26 $3,918.46
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 75,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 100,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $797.26 $4,367.46
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 100,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $808.07 $4,154.87
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 100,000 0.15 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $705.67 $4,094.87
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 100,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 125,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $996.58 $4,566.78
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 125,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $1,010.09 $4,356.89
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 125,000 0.15 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $882.09 $4,271.29
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 125,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 150,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $1,195.89 $4,766.09
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 150,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $1,212.11 $4,558.91
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 150,000 0.15 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $1,058.51 $4,447.71
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 150,000 0.15 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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$4,447.71
$4,271.29
$4,094.87
$3,918.46
$3,742.04
APPENDIX  C-8
Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to DAMASCUS via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 150,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $398.63 $3,968.83
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 150,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $404.04 $3,750.84
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 150,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $352.84 $3,742.04
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 150,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 200,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $531.51 $4,101.71
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 200,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $538.71 $3,885.51
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 200,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $470.45 $3,859.65
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 200,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 250,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $664.38 $4,234.58
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 250,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $673.39 $4,020.19
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 250,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $588.06 $3,977.26
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 250,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 300,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $797.26 $4,367.46
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 300,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $808.07 $4,154.87
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 300,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $705.67 $4,094.87
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 300,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 350,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $930.14 $4,500.34
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 350,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $942.75 $4,289.55
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 350,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $823.29 $4,212.49
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 350,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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$3,742.04
$4,212.49
$4,094.87
$3,977.26
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APPENDIX  C-9
Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to DAMASCUS via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 150,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $797.26 $4,367.46
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 150,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $808.07 $4,154.87
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 150,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $705.67 $4,094.87
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 150,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 200,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $1,063.01 $4,633.21
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 200,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $1,077.43 $4,424.23
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 200,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $940.90 $4,330.10
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 200,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 250,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $1,328.77 $4,898.97
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 250,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $1,346.78 $4,693.58
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 250,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $1,176.12 $4,565.32
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 250,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 300,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $1,594.52 $5,164.72
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 300,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $1,616.14 $4,962.94
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 300,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $1,411.35 $4,800.55
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 300,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Damascus 0.4 6688 100 1.7 0 350 0 0 24 70 70 4 0 350,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3570.2 19.4 $1,860.27 $5,430.47
Beirut-Damascus 0.4 6607 100 1.02 0 200 0 200 24 70 70 2 2.5 350,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3346.8 19.7 $1,885.50 $5,232.30
Aqaba-Damascus 0.4 6223 100 1 0 550 0 250 24 70 70 3 2.5 350,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3389.2 17.2 $1,646.57 $5,035.77
Haifa-Damascus 0.4 6548 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 350,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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$4,800.55
$5,035.77
$4,094.87
$4,330.10
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APPENDIX  C-10
Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to TEL AVIV via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 50,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $116.49 $3,575.69
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 50,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $93.03 $3,582.23
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 50,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 50,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 65,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $151.44 $3,610.64
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 65,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $120.94 $3,610.14
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 65,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 65,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 80,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $186.39 $3,645.59
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 80,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $148.84 $3,638.04
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 80,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 80,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 95,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $221.34 $3,680.54
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 95,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $176.75 $3,665.95
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 95,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 95,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 110,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $256.28 $3,715.48
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 110,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $204.66 $3,693.86
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 110,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 110,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 125,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $291.23 $3,750.43
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 125,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $232.57 $3,721.77
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 125,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 125,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to TEL AVIV via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 50,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $174.74 $3,633.94
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 50,000 0.075 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $139.54 $3,628.74
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 50,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 50,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 65,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $227.16 $3,686.36
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 65,000 0.075 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $181.40 $3,670.60
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 65,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 65,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 80,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $279.58 $3,738.78
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 80,000 0.075 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $223.27 $3,712.47
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 80,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 80,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 95,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $332.00 $3,791.20
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 95,000 0.075 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $265.13 $3,754.33
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 95,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 95,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 110,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $384.42 $3,843.62
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 110,000 0.075 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $306.99 $3,796.19
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 110,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 110,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 125,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $436.85 $3,896.05
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 125,000 0.075 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $348.86 $3,838.06
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 125,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 125,000 0.075 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to TEL AVIV via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 50,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $232.98 $3,692.18
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 50,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $186.06 $3,675.26
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 50,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 50,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 65,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $302.88 $3,762.08
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 65,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $241.87 $3,731.07
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 65,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 65,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 80,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $372.78 $3,831.98
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 80,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $297.69 $3,786.89
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 80,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 80,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 95,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $442.67 $3,901.87
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 95,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $353.51 $3,842.71
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 95,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 95,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 110,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $512.57 $3,971.77
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 110,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $409.32 $3,898.52
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 110,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 110,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 125,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $582.46 $4,041.66
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 125,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $465.14 $3,954.34
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 125,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 125,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to TEL AVIV via different routes  
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 150,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $349.48 $3,808.68
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 150,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $279.08 $3,768.28
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 150,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 150,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 175,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $407.72 $3,866.92
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 175,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $325.60 $3,814.80
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 175,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 175,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 200,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $465.97 $3,925.17
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 200,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $372.11 $3,861.31
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 200,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 200,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 225,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $524.22 $3,983.42
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 225,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $418.63 $3,907.83
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 225,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 225,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 250,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $582.46 $4,041.66
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 250,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $465.14 $3,954.34
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 250,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 250,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 350,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $815.45 $4,274.65
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 350,000 0.05 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $651.20 $4,140.40
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 350,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 350,000 0.05 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Total Transport Logistics Cost for shipping from Hong Kong  to TEL AVIV via different routes 
a Dhn Rn ßne1 ßne2 Dnxt1 Dxet2 Ox Ss St St Hn Hx Vi ? ? Hs Hz Hh F C1 Htotal C2 TC min (TC)
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 150,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $698.95 $4,158.15
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 150,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $558.17 $4,047.37
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 150,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 150,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 175,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $815.45 $4,274.65
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 175,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $651.20 $4,140.40
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 175,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 175,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 200,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $931.94 $4,391.14
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 200,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $744.22 $4,233.42
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 200,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 200,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 225,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $1,048.43 $4,507.63
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 225,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $837.25 $4,326.45
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 225,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 225,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 250,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $1,164.92 $4,624.12
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 250,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $930.28 $4,419.48
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 250,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 250,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Haifa-Tel aviv 0.4 6548 100 4.5 0 120 0 0 24 70 70 2 0 350,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 3459.2 17.0 $1,630.89 $5,090.09
Aqaba-Tel aviv 0.4 6223 100 1 4.5 400 100 50 24 70 70 1 1 350,000 0.1 0 11 0 0 0 3489.2 13.6 $1,302.39 $4,791.59
Beirut-Tel aviv 0.4 6607 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 2 n/a 350,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lattakia-Tel aviv 0.4 6688 100 n/a 0 n/a 0 0 24 70 70 4 n/a 350,000 0.1 100 12 1 2 100 n/a n/a n/a n/a
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